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Calleros: Reconciling the Goals of Federalism with the Policy of Title VII:

RECONCILING THE GOALS OF
FEDERALISM WITH THE POLICY OF TITLE
VII: SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION IN
JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF EEOC
CONCILIATION AGREEMENTS
Charles R. Calleros*
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 prohibits employers,
employment agencies, and labor organizations from discriminating in

employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.' If the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)3
finds reasonable cause to believe that a charge of discrimination is
valid, it attempts to conciliate. Title VII implicitly authorizes the
EEOC to negotiate a conciliation agreement,5 which is intended to
* Professor of Law, Arizona State University College of Law; B.A., 1975, University of
California at Santa Cruz; J.D., 1978, University of California at Davis School of Law. The
author thanks Ann Scott and Howard Kopp for their research assistance, and Karen Crile for
word processing. The author received support for this project from an A.S.U. Faculty Grantin-Aid.
If the author were a federal judge confronted with the question addressed in this Article,
he would be inclined to broadly construe section 706(f)(3) in an attempt to find federal jurisdiction of an action to enforce an EEOC conciliation agreement. However, in this Article the
author develops the opposing argument, in part to illustrate two points: (1) with a continuing
decline in judicial activism in the coming years and decades, the best hope for expansion in
civil rights may lie in legislative action; and (2) the most effective judicial means of enhancing
the fulfillment of Title VII's remedial goals is expansive interpretation of the express statutory
provisions defining Title VII's scope of coverage, prohibitions and remedies.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)-(c) (1982).
3. The EEOC is an administrative agency created under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 20OOe4(a) (1982). The EEOC is empowered to issue procedural regulations, to investigate and conciliate charges of discrimination, and to bring civil enforcement actions. See 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-4 to 2000e-6, 2000e-8, 2000e-9, 2000e-12 (1982).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982) ("the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any
such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation,
and persuasion").
5. Section 706(b) directs the EEOC to attempt conciliation. Id. Section 706(0)(1) authorizes the EEOC to bring a civil actiion if it "has been unable to secure from the respondent a
conciliation agreement acceptable to the [EEOC]." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982). A Fed-
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resolve the charge prior to litigation in federal court.6
On occasion, the EEOC or a private party has brought suit in
federal district court to enforce a conciliation agreement that the re-

spondent allegedly has breached. In some cases the federal district
courts have assumed subject matter jurisdiction over such actions, 7
even though diversity jurisdiction is lacking8 and though the actions
eral regulation contemplates the execution of written conciliation agreements. 29 C.F.R. §
1601.22 (1977). A version of the proposed text of Title VII included language that would have
specifically authorized the EEOC to negotiate a conciliation agreement: "[Tihe Commission
must endeavor . . . if appropriate, to obtain from the charged party a written agreement
describing particular practices which he agrees to refrain from committing." H.R. REP. No.
914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2355, 2404, cited
In EEOC v. Liberty Trucking Co., 528 F. Supp. 610, 613 (W.D. Wis. 1981), rev'd, 695 F.2d
1038 (7th Cir. 1982). Congress omitted this language, however, from the subsequently enacted
bill. See Liberty Trucking Co., 528 F. Supp. at 613 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1970)).
6. A settlement agreement may be negotiated at several different stages during the
processing of a discrimination charge. The charge may be resolved in a "pre-determination
settlement" negotiated after the charge is filed, but before the EEOC makes a reasonablecause determination. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.20 (1983); EEOC v. Henry Beck Co., 729 F.2d
301, 303 (4th Cir. 1984); B. SCHLEi AND P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
944 (2d ed. 1983). The settlement of a claim brought under Title VII in a federal district
court may be incorporated later in a consent decree, subject to the court's approval and enforceable under the court's contempt powers. See EEOC v. Liberty Trucking Co., 695 F.2d
1038, 1043-44 (7th Cir. 1982); Fairfax Countywide Citizens Ass'n v. County of Fairfax, 571
F.2d 1299, 1303 n.8 (4th Cir. 1978) (court retains jurisdiction to enforce settlement agreement
incorporated in consent decree), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1047 (1978). Cf. Weills v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 553 F. Supp. 640, 641 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (plaintiff settled after she received notice
of right to sue, but before she filed suit in district court). This Article focuses on problems in
enforcing "conciliation agreements"-- settlement agreements negotiated and executed after a
determination of reasonable cause and after conciliation has begun, but before either the
EEOC or the alleged discriminatee has filed suit. See B. SCHLEi AND P. GROSSMAN, supra this
note, at 965-66.
7. See, e.g., EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 77, 81-82 (N.D. Tex. 1982),
aff'd, 714 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2384 (1984); EEOC v. Contour
Chair Lounge Co., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 815, 816 (E.D. Mo. 1978), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part on other grounds, 596 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1979); EEOC v. St. Louis Labor
Health Inst., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 250, 251 (E.D. Mo. 1978); EEOC v. Mississippi Baptist Hosp., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 411, 412 (S.D. Miss. 1976).
8. Congress has conferred upon the federal district courts diversity jurisdiction of civil
actions between "citizens of different states." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1982) (conferring jurisdiction within judicial power as set forth in U.S. CONsr. art. III, § 2, cl. 1). A suit brought
solely by the EEOC is not likely to be within the court's diversity jurisdiction, because the
EEOC probably is not a "citizen" of any state. Compare McGlynn v. Employers Commercial
Union Ins. Co. of Am., 386 F. Supp. 774, 776 (D.P.R. 1974) and FDIC v. National Surety
Corp., 345 F. Supp. 885, 887 (S.D. Iowa 1972) (both holding that federal agency is not a
citizen of any state) with Garden Homes, Inc. v. Mason, 238 F.2d 651, 653-54 (Ist Cir. 1956)
(FHA is a "federal corporation" and a citizen of the District of Columbia). A suit brought
solely by an individual discriminatee against a corporate employer would not be within federal
diversity jurisdiction if the individual was a citizen of the state in which the employer was
incorporated or had its principal place of business. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1982).
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arguably arise solely under state contract law. 9 Two federal courts of
appeal have squarely addressed the jurisdictional issue and have

broadly construed Title VII's federal jurisdictional provision'0 to encompass actions seeking enforcement of EEOC conciliation agreements."' Each court inferred a congressional intent to grant such ju-

risdiction from the primacy of conciliation in the legislative scheme
as a means of achieving the goals of Title VII. 12 Neither court, how-

ever, considered countervailing principles of federalism in its expansive interpretation of Title VII's jurisdictional provision.
This Article seeks to present a more balanced analysis of the
jurisdictional question by examining the tension between the principles of federalism and the remedial goals of Title VII. Part I outlines

enforcement and conciliation procedures under Title VII. Part II
considers whether the express provisions of Title VII provide a basis
for subject matter jurisdiction, under either the specific jurisdictional
provision of Title VII,' 3 or the general statutory grant of federal
question jurisdiction, 4 and proceeds to examine the theory that an

action to enforce an EEOC conciliation agreement arises under and
9. See, e.g., EEOC v. Liberty Trucking Co., 528 F. Supp. 610, 614-24 (W.D. Wis.
1981), rev'd, 695 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1982); Okonko v. Union Oil Co., 519 F. Supp. 372, 378
(C.D. Cal. 1981). See also Weills v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 553 F. Supp. 640, 643 (N.D.
Cal. 1982) (private settlement agreement reached after EEOC issued notice of right to sue,
and before charging party filed suit in district court); Perdue v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 29
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1659, 1661 (W.D. Va. 1981) (dictum) (pre-determination settlement agreement could be enforced in state court under principles of state law), rev'd on
other grounds, 690 F.2d 1091 (4th Cir. 1982).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(O(3) (1982) (U.S. district courts "shall have jurisdiction of
actions brought under this subchapter").
11. EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 714 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 2384 (1984); EEOC v. Liberty Trucking Co., 695 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1982). Relying on
Liberty Trucking Co. and Safeway Stores, the Fourth Circuit has taken jurisdiction of an
action to enforce a pre-determination settlement agreement. EEOC v. Henry Beck Co., 729
F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1984). See supra note 6. Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit has applied Liberty Trucking Co. and Safeway Stores to employees' releases of Title VII claims in exchange
for their employer's performance of promises contained in a conciliation agreement with the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance, which had cited the employer for violation of Executive Order 11246. Eatmon v. Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc., 769 F.2d 1503, 1508-13 (11th
Cir. 1985).
12. EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 714 F.2d 567, 572-74 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 2384 (1984); EEOC v. Liberty Trucking Co., 695 F.2d 1038, 1041-44 (7th Cir.
1982).
13. See supra note 10.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). Other jurisdictional statutes may apply as well: 28
U.S.C. § 1337 (1982) (question arising under regulation of commerce); 28 U.S.C. §
1343(a)(4) (1982) (action authorized by civil rights statute); 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1982) (action
brought by federal agency expressly authorized to sue). This Article devotes extensive discussion only to § 1331. See infra note 49.
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is governed by federal common law, thus providing a basis for jurisdiction under the general statutory grant.
This Article concludes that under current legislation, an action
to enforce an EEOC conciliation agreement does not raise a federal
question concerning application of either Title VII or federal common law. Congress may choose to strengthen procedures for federal
enforcement of Title VII rights by expressly granting federal jurisdiction of actions to enforce conciliation agreements. Currently, however, absent an independent basis for federal jurisdiction, 15 such an
action must be brought in state court and must be governed by state
rules of decision.

I.

ENFORCEMENT AND CONCILIATION PROCEDURES UNDER

TITLE VII

Title VII sets forth complex and comprehensive procedures for
remedying unlawful discrimination in employment.1 6 A charge of
discrimination may be filed with the EEOC by or on behalf of persons claiming to be victims of the alleged discrimination, or by a
member of the EEOC. 7 Title VII also sets forth time limitations
within which charges must be filed with the EEOC, and it requires
prior deferral to state agencies that have authority to remedy employment discrimination.' 8
The EEOC has the power to investigate the discrimination
charge to determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that
15. For example, under the rule established by the Supreme Court in UMW v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715 (1966), a federal court may take jurisdiction over a state contract claim on a
conciliation agreement if that claim is pendent to a federal claim. See, e.g., McKeever v. Atlantic Spring Co., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1059, 1061 (E.D. Pa. 1980). Cf. Davis v.
Ohio Barge Line, Inc., 697 F.2d 549, 554 (3d Cir. 1983) (state claim on settlement agreement
pendent to federal claim on a collective bargaining agreement); Stamford Bd. of Educ. v.
Stamford Educ. Ass'n, 697 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1982) (state claim on indemnity agreement
pendent to federal claim under Title VII and Equal Pay Act). But cf. Pennhurst State School
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (in some circumstances eleventh amendment bars
a pendent state claim against the State); Haroldson v. Hospitality Systems, Inc., 596 F. Supp.
1460 (D. Colo. 1984) (Title VII precludes pendent jurisdiction of state tort claims).
A conciliation agreement may include a provision stating that the parties consent to federal jurisdiction in an action to enforce the agreement. See, e.g., 8 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MAN.
(BNA) 431:69 (1978) (sample conciliation agreement). The parties cannot create federal jurisdiction, however, by waiver or agreement. See, e.g., Love v. Turlington, 733 F.2d 1562,
1564 (11 th Cir. 1984); C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 7, at 23 (4th ed. 1983).
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1982).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c)-(e) (1982).
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the charge is justified. 19 If the EEOC finds no reasonable cause to
believe that the charge is true, it will dismiss the charge 0 and notify
the alleged discriminatees and the respondent of its action. 1 If the

EEOC finds reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, it
will then attempt to conciliate the dispute.2 2 Conciliation plays an

important role in Title VII procedures as a means of assuring equal
employment opportunity.2
Successful conciliation avoids litigation through the execution of
a formal conciliation agreement.2 4 In such an agreement the respondent routinely denies any violation of Title VII 25 but promises to
grant employment benefits to the alleged victims of discrimination.26
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982) (the EEOC "shall make an investigation"); 2
E.E.O.C. COMIL. MAN. (CCH) 1 2022 (1982) (objective of investigation is to obtain enough
information to determine truth of charge). If the EEOC has not filed a civil action or successfully conciliated the charge within 180 days of the filing of the charge, the aggrieved party
may demand notice of his or her right to sue. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1982); Johnson v.
Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 458 (1975). As a practical matter, however, the
EEOC is unable to investigate fully all charges within 180 days of the filing. See id. at 455-56,
465 n.l 1. See also Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 811 n.6 (1980); United States v.
Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 848 & n.25 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 944 (1976); Harshaw v. Pan Am, 70 F.R.D. 462, 464 (D.C.C. 1975); B. SCHLEI AND P.
GROSSMAN, supra note 6, at 946 n.115. Therefore, the EEOC has adopted regulations under
which it may issue a notice of right to sue prior to the expiration of 180 days if it determines
that final action within 180 days is improbable. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(2) (1983); Brown v.
Puget Sound Elec. Apprenticeship & Training Trust, 732 F.2d 726, 729 (9th Cir. 1984).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) (cooperation and
voluntary compliance, facilitated by state and federal conciliation, were selected as the preferred means for achieving the goal of assuring equal employment opportunity); EEOC v.
Liberty Trucking Co., 695 F.2d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 1982) (before the 1972 amendments to
Title VII, the EEOC was empowered only to investigate and to negotiate voluntary compliance, thereby underscoring the importance of that element of the EEOC's current responsibilities). In recent years, the EEOC has encouraged pre-determination settlements, see supra note
6, in an effort to reduce its backlog of charges awaiting investigation. See, e.g., EEOC v.
Henry Beck Co., 729 F.2d 301, 303 (4th Cir. 1984).
24. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 (1974) ("presumably an employee may waive his cause of action under Title VII as part of a voluntary settlement"). See
Trujillo v. Colorado, 649 F.2d 823, 826-27 (10th Cir. 1981) (conciliation agreement); United
States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 856-62 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 944 (1976) (consent decree).
25. See 8 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MAN. (BNA) 431:70k (1981) (sample conciliation agreement); 3 E.E.O.C. COMPL. MAN. (CCH) 1 7307 (1981) (standard clause).
26. See, e.g., 8 FAIR EMPL PRAC. MAN. (BNA) 431:70(1) (1981) (sample conciliation
agreement); EEOC v. Liberty Trucking Co., 695 F.2d 1038, 1039-40 (7th Cir. 1982) (employer agreed to reinstate charging party, to pay him back wages and other compensation, and
to adjust his work schedule to accommodate religious beliefs).
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In exchange, the charging party 27 promises to refrain from bringing
a civil action on the charge, often on the condition that the respon-

dent continue to perform its contractual obligations.28 The respondent typically agrees to permit the EEOC to monitor its compliance

with the agreement.2
In addition, the EEOC often uses the conciliation process to extract relief from a respondent relating to matters outside the charge

that prompted the need for conciliation." The respondent, for example, may promise in the conciliation agreement to modify practices
or policies that are not mentioned in the charge and that affect employees who are not named in the charge.3 1 The respondent may also
provisions of Title VII
promise to refrain from violating 3 specified
2
during the term of the agreement.

A conciliation agreement stemming from charges of individual
discrimination is signed by the alleged discriminatees and by the respondent.33 Ordinarily, agents of the EEOC also sign the agreement,
to signify that the EEOC has "witnessed" the execution of the
agreement and has "approved" its provisions.3 4 Without more, the
EEOC's participation in the execution of the agreement might be
viewed as simply a statement of approval that operates to terminate
27. If the charge was filed by individual victims of alleged discrimination, those persons
will normally be principal parties to the conciliation agreement. See, e.g., 8 FAIR EMPL. PRAC.
MAN. (BNA) 431:70k, 431:70m (1981) (sample conciliation agreement). If a member of the
EEOC files a charge alleging discrimination against a large class of employees, however, the
EEOC may be a principal party to the agreement, and individual discriminatees may participate in the settlement by executing separate release forms. See id. at 431:53-69 (sample conciliation agreement); id. at 431:69-70 (sample pre-determination settlement agreement);
United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F.2d 826, 859 n.37 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976) (quoting from sample conciliation agreement); id. at 837-38
(consent decree).
28. See, e.g., EEOC v. Liberty Trucking Co., 695 F.2d 1038, 1040 (7th Cir. 1982). Cf.
8 FAIR EmPL. PRAC. MAN. (BNA) 431:70k (1981) (employee's promise to refrain from suing,
but not that of the EEOC, is conditioned upon full counter-performance).
29. See, e.g., EEOC v. Liberty Trucking Co., 528 F. Supp. 610, 612 (W.D. Wis. 1981),
rev'd, 695 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1982); 8 FAIR EMPL PRAC. MAN. (BNA) 431:70k (1981) (sam-

ple conciliation agreement); 3 E.E.O.C. COMPL. MAN. (CCH)
30.

7306 (1981) (standard clause).

See 8 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MAN. (BNA) 431:51 (1981) (EEOC policy guide).

31. Id.
32. See id. at 431:70k, 431:701; 3 E.E.O.C. COMPL. MAN. (CCH) 1 7309 (1981) (standard clauses).
33.

See 8 FAIR EMPL PRAC. MAN. (BNA) 431:70m - 431:70n (1981) (sample concilia-

tion agreement); EEOC v. Liberty Trucking Co., 528 F. Supp. 610, 613 (W.D. Wis. 1981),
rev'd, 695 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1982).
34.

See 8 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MAN. (BNA) 431:70m - 431:70n (1981) (sample concilia-

tion agreement).
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or suspend its statutory authority to sue on the charge.3 1 At the re-

quest of the respondent,3 6 however, the EEOC may formally participate in the bargained-for exchange 31 by joining the discriminatees in
their promise to refrain from suing on the charge.3 8 In those circumstances, the EEOC clearly has done more than simply "approve" the
agreement; it has become a full party to it.39

If the EEOC is unable to secure an acceptable conciliation
agreement from the respondent, it will either bring a civil action

against the respondent in federal district court or notify the alleged
discriminatees of their right to bring such an action.40 If the district
court finds that the respondent has committed or is committing 4' an
35. The EEOC may bring a civil suit against the respondent if the EEOC has been
unable to secure an acceptable conciliation agreement from the respondent. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(f)(1) (1982).
36. "Waiver of the Commission's right to sue shall not be included in an agreement
unless it is specifically requested by the Respondent and, if it is so included, it shall be a
waiver solely [sic] with relation to the specific charges covered by the agreement." 3 E.E.O.C.
COMPL. MAN. (CCH) 7308 (1981) (emphasis in original).
37. The traditional requirement of consideration in an enforceable contract is satisfied
with the exchange of reciprocally induced promises to engage in acts or forbearance. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 comment b (1981). In a conciliation agreement, the
employer's promises to engage in specified acts and forbearance regarding employment practices and compensation are exchanged for promises given by the alleged discriminatee or the
EEOC, or both, to forbear from asserting a nonfrivolous claim under Title VII. See 1 A.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 139-41 (1963). The consideration requirement is met in
agreements in which both the EEOC and the alleged victim of discrimination promise not to
sue, even though a single respondent exchanges promises with two other parties, see I A.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 125, at 535-36 (1963), and even though the EEOC's promise is induced by the respondent's promise to grant benefits to persons or entities other than the
EEOC. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71(4) (1981).
38. 8 FAIR EMPL PRAC. MAN. (BNA) 431:70k (1981) (sample conciliation agreement);
3 E.E.O.C. COMPL. MAN. (CCH) 7308 (1981) (comment to standard clause).
39. One court has questioned whether the EEOC would be recognized under state law as
a party to the conciliation agreement. EEOC v. Liberty Trucking Co., 695 F.2d 1038, 1043
(7th Cir. 1982). In that case, however, the EEOC did not join in the exchange, but merely
signified its approval. See EEOC v. Liberty Trucking Co., 528 F. Supp. 610, 612-13 (W.D.
Wis. 1981), rev'd, 695 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1982).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)-(3) (1982).
41. The statute authorizes relief upon a finding that the respondent has "intentionally
engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice." 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(g) (1982) (emphasis added). This statutory requirement of intent, however, has been
liberally construed to require only a finding that the respondent's alleged discriminatory conduct was volitional and not the result of an accident or inadvertence. See, e.g., Laffey v.
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 454-55 nn. 171, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1086 (1978). Title VII liability may be based on either intentional discrimination,
see International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977), or the
discriminatory effects of a facially neutral employment policy. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
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unlawful employment practice, it may enjoin the unlawful practice
and may order "affirmative action," such as "reinstatement or hiring
of employees, with or without back pay."'42 The court may also exercise its discretion
to award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevail43
ing party.
II.

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION:

FEDERAL QUESTION

Article III of the United States Constitution sets, forth the limits of federal judicial power." Part of that judicial power extends to
"all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
' Congress has enacted several statmade, under their Authority."45
utes vesting federal district courts with original subject matter jurisdiction in cases that are within the judicial power of the federal
courts by virtue of article III's "arising under" clause.46 In contrast
to the general jurisdiction exercised by most state courts, the jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited to that specifically granted by
Congress within constitutional bounds; 47considerations of federalstate relations grounded in the constitutional reservation of powers to
the states have led to narrow constructions and strict applications of

congressional grants of federal jurisdiction.48
42. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982). As prevailing parties, neither the EEOC nor the
United States would be eligible to receive attorney's fees. Id.
44. U.S. CONsT. art. III.
45. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl.I (emphasis added).
46, See, e.g., 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER AND E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3561, at 390, and §§ 3568-85, at 463-568 (1982).
47. Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 252 (1867); Lindahl v. Office of Personnel
Mgt., 718 F.2d 391, 396 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 105 S.Ct. 1620 (1985)
(citing to early Supreme Court case law); Frank v. Arnold, 717 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1983);
C. WRIGHT, supra note 15, § 7, at 22.
48. The Supreme Court narrowly construed a federal removal statute, stating that:
the policy of the successive acts of Congress regulating the jurisdiction of federal
courts is one calling for the strict construction of such legislation. The power reserved to the states under the Constitution to provide for the determination of controversies in their courts, may be restricted only by the action of Congress in conformity to the Judiciary Articles of the Constitution. "Due regard for the rightful
independence of state governments, which should actuate federal courts, requires
that they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the
statute has defined."
Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941) (quoting Healy v. Ratta,
292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934)). See also Boelens v. Redman Homes, Inc., 748 F.2d 1058, 1067-68
(5th Cir. 1984) (narrowly construing the jurisdictional provision of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act); Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries, Ltd., 704 F.2d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 1983) (narrowly construing congressional grant of diversity jurisdiction). "[D]ue regard for the constitu-
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Of the statutes arguably granting federal jurisdiction for actions
to enforce EEOC conciliation agreements, 49 this Article discusses
tional allocation of powers between the state and federal systems requires a federal court
scrupulously to confine itself to the jurisdiction conferred on it by Congress and permitted by
the Constitution." In re Carter, 618 F.2d 1093, 1098 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
949 (1981), quoted in Gross v. Hougland, 712 F.2d 1034, 1036 (6th Cir. 1983) ("[a] federal
court is not a general repository of judicial power"), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1281 (1984).
Professor Wright concludes:
Because of [Constitutional and congressional limitations on the jurisdiction] of
the federal courts, and because it would not be simply wrong but indeed an unconstitutional invasion of the powers reserved to the states if those courts were to entertain cases not within their jurisdiction, the rule is well settled that the party seeking
to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court must demonstrate that the case is within
the competence of such a court. The presumption is that the court lacks jurisdiction
in a particular case until it has been demonstrated that jurisdiction over the subject
matter exists.
[The rule that a federal court will dismiss an action for want of jurisdiction on
the motion of the party who invoked federal jurisdiction but later lost on the merits]
could hardly be defended as a sensible regulation of procedure, and can only be
justified by the delicate problems of federal-state relations that are involved.
C. WRIGHT, supra note 15, § 7, at 22-23 (footnotes omitted).
49. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982) provides for federal jurisdiction of actions arising
under any Act of Congress regulating commerce. Section 1337 warrants no separate discussion, because its "arising under" test is no broader than that in § 1331. See Franchise Tax Bd.
v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8 n.7 (1983). Until a few years ago, §
1337 was significant primarily because it granted jurisdiction of actions involving interstate
commerce that did not meet the minimum jurisdictional amount set forth in § 1331. See C.
WRIGHT, supra note 15, § 32, at 177 n.10. This distinction disappeared in 1980 with the
elimination of the minimum jurisdictional amount requirement from § 1331. See id. at 181 &
n.33.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(4) (1982) (formerly § 1343(4)) provides for federal jurisdiction
of "any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person . . . [tlo recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights." Like § 1337, § 1343 eliminated the requirement of jurisdictional amount
in certain actions but did not introduce a broader standard than the "arising under" test of §
1331. See Mahone v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1036 n.34 (3d Cir. 1977) (§ 1343(4) is no
broader than § 1331), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 904 (1978). See also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618-20 (1979) (§ 1343(4) is broader than § 1343(3) only in
its omission of the "under color of state law" requirement); Monks v. Hetherington, 573 F.2d
1164, 1167 (10th Cir. 1978) (§ 1343(3) is broader than § 1331 only in its elimination of
jurisdictional amount). Congress expanded the scope of § 1343 in 1979 to include the District
of Columbia within the scope of some of its provisions; the amendment changed the subsection
numbering of § 1343(4) to § 1343(a)(4), but left the language and purpose of that subsection
unchanged. H.R. REP.No. 548, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-4, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. Naws 2609, 2609-12.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1982) confers federal jurisdiction of civil actions "commenced by
the United States, or by any agency or officer thereof expressly authorized to sue by Act of
Congress." By its terms, § 1345 does not grant jurisdiction of an action brought by a private
party to enforce a conciliation agreement. Nor does it grant jurisdiction of such an action
brought by the EEOC, because the statute requires express authorization to sue, specific to the
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only two:

Section 1331 of 28 U.S.C., 50 and section 706(0(3) of Ti-

VII.5 1

Neither of these statutes vests the district courts with the

tle

full extent of the federal judicial power that Congress is authorized
to grant by the "arising under" clause of article 111.52 This Article
assumes that an action to enforce an EEOC conciliation agreement
is within the constitutional limits of federal judicial power, 53 and adkind of action brought, see Marshall v. Gibson's Products, Inc., 584 F.2d 668, 676-77 (5th Cir.
1978), and because Title VII does not expressly authorize the EEOC to sue to enforce a conciliation agreement, see infra note 105.
The question of whether the United States would have standing to sue under § 1345 to
enforce a conciliation agreement to which the EEOC is a party is beyond the scope of this
Article. See generally Marshall v. Gibson's Products, Inc., 584 F.2d 668, 676 nn. 10-11 (5th
Cir. 1978).
50. Section 1331 provides that "[ihe district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §
1331 (1982).
51. Section 706(0(3) provides in relevant part that "[e]ach United States district court
...shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(0(3) (1982).
52. Although both 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and article III of the Constitution employ the
phrase "arising under" federal law, the Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that "[a]rt. III
'arising under' jurisdiction is broader than federal-question jurisdiction under § 1331." Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 495 (1983), cited with approval in
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9 n.8 (1983).
Section 706(0(3) is limited by its terms to actions brought under Title VII. See supra
note 51. In this regard it is narrower than the general federal question judicial power under
article IIl. Moreover, this Article concludes that the phrase "brought under" in § 706(0(3) is
no broader than the phrase "arising under" in 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See infra notes 167-222 and
accompanying text.
53. If the merits of the constitutional question were reached, the starting point of the
analysis would be with Chief Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court in Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). In Osborn, the Court concluded that article III
judicial power extends to suits brought by a federally chartered bank. Id. at 823. To reach that
result, the Court stated and applied its celebrated federal-ingredient test:
We think, then, that when a question to which the judicial power of the Union is
extended by the constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the
power of Congress to give the Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that cause, although
other questions of fact or of law may be involved in it.
Id. at 823. The federal law incorporating the bank provided the source of the bank's rights and
powers, thus forming an ingredient in any action brought by the bank, even one to enforce a
state contract claim, and even one in which the federal "ingredient" is not relied upon or
challenged. See id. at 823-28; Bank of the United States v. Planter's Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
904, 905 (1824) (applying Osborn dictum to contract claim). See also C. WRIGHT, supra note
15, § 17, at 91-92 (constitutional question could have been decided on narrower grounds).
Under Marshall's federal-ingredient test in Osborn, article III judicial power probably would
extend to suits to enforce EEOC conciliation agreements. The substantive provisions of Title
VII both provide a basis for a contractual exchange, see supra note 34, and authorize the
conciliation process out of which the agreement arises, see supra note 5.
Earlier language in the Osborn opinion suggested that article III judicial power extends to
actions in which "the title or right set up by the party, may be defeated by one construction of
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dresses only the question of whether Congress has exercised its legislative power to vest original subject matter jurisdiction over such actions in the district courts.54 Three theories are discussed: (1) such
actions "arise under" the provisions of Title VII, within the meaning
of section 1331; (2) the actions are "brought under" Title VII,
within the meaning of section 706(f)(3); and (3) the actions "arise
under" federal common law, within the meaning of section 1331. As
the following discussion illustrates, none of these theories justify federal jurisdiction over EEOC conciliation agreements.
A.

Section 1331-

Action Arising Under the Provisions of
Title VII

Section 1331 of Title 28 confers upon district courts general
federal question jurisdiction: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution,

laws, or treaties of the United States." 55 Because Title VII explicitly
provides for EEOC conciliation and implicitly authorizes execution

of an EEOC conciliation agreement,5 6 an action to enforce an EEOC
conciliation agreement arguably "arises under" the federal laws con-

tained in Title VII.
The scope of jurisdiction under section 1331 is limited by the
controversial rule that the federal question must appear on the face

of the plaintiff's "well pleaded complaint." 51 Beyond that "quick rule
the constitution or law of the United States, and sustained by the opposite construction." Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 822. Professor Wright concludes that the last-quoted passage
states a more restrictive test than does the "ingredient" language of Osborn, but that the
ingredient test is more compatible with the reasoning of the opinion. C. WRIGHT, supra note
15, § 17, at 92. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court recently referred to the last-quoted passage in
interpreting Osborn to reflect "a broad conception of 'arising under' jurisdiction, according to
which Congress may confer on the federal courts jurisdiction over any case or controversy that
might call for the application of federal law." Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461
U.S. 480, 492 (1983). The Court hinted that the standards announced in Osborn were ripe for
reevaluation in the proper case. Id.
54. This approach is consistent with the judicial preference for avoiding constitutional
questions if a dispute can be resolved on the basis of statutory construction. See Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). Cf. Osborn v.
Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 816-28 (1824) (Court found congressional
grant of jurisdiction before addressing question of judicial power under article III). Under that
rule of preference, a court would not reach the constitutional question if it found no statutory
grant of jurisdiction of actions to enforce EEOC conciliation agreements.
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
56. See supra note 5.
57. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10-11
& n.9 (1983); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152-54 (1908); C.
WRIGHT, supra note 15, § 18. The "well pleaded complaint" rule is not a limitation on article
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of thumb,"' 8 the "arising under" standard, as explained in a celebrated definition expressed by Justice Holmes in American Well
Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co.,59 appears simple and straightforward: "A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action."6 Under this test, for example, an action for damages under a
California statute that imposes personal liability for violation of its
provisions is an action that arises under state law; 61 similarly, an action to compel issuance of an EEOC investigative subpoena under a
federal labor statute that expressly provides for issuance of subpoenas at the request of a private party is an action that arises under
federal law.6 2
Unfortunately, the "arising under" standard is clouded with
greater uncertainty63 than is suggested by Holmes' American Well
Works test, which does not fully explain the Supreme Court decisions applying section 1331. It may be overinclusive in some circumstances; 64 more often, however, it is underinclusive. 65 In the leading
IiIjudicial

power; rather, it reflects restrictive judicial interpretation of § 1331. See Verlinden
B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 492-95 (1983); C. WRIGHT, supra note 15, §
18, at 102 & n.19. Particularly intricate problems are raised in the application of the rule to
actions for declaratory judgment. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation
Trust, 463 U.S. I, 14-16 (1983); Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667
(1950).
58. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 11 (1983).
59. 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
60. Id. at 260.
61. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 4-9
(1983). The Court supplemented Holmes' test with that of Kansas City Title & Trust Co.,
Infra notes 66, 67, 131-37 and accompanying text, but rejected federal jurisdiction on the basis
of application of the well-pleaded complaint rule, supra note 57. FranchiseTax Bd., 463 U.S.
at 9-10.
62. See Food Town Stores, Inc. v. EEOC, 708 F.2d 920, 922 (4th Cir. 1983) (action
raised conflict between the federal statute and a federal regulation), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1005 (1984). On the merits, the court concluded that the statute did not require the EEOC to
issue the subpoenas. 708 F.2d at 923-25.
63. E.g., FranchiseTax Bd., 463 U.S. at 8 ("the statutory phrase. . . has resisted all
attempts to frame a single, precise definition for determining which cases fall within, and
which cases fall outside, the original jurisdiction of the district courts"); Keaukaha-Panaewa
Community Ass'n v. Hawaiian Homes Comm'n, 588 F.2d 1216, 1225 (9th Cir. 1978) (relevant Supreme Court "cases do not fit snuggly into a single, logical mosaic"), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 826 (1979); C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 17, at 91 (4th ed. 1983) (no clear
test yet developed); M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF
JUDICIAL POWER 64 (1980) ("substantial disagreement exists over the exact meaning and
scope of the statute"); Chisum, The Allocation of JurisdictionBetween State and Federal
Courts in Patent Litigation, 46 WASH. L. REv. 633, 638-39 (1971) (jurisdictional counterpart
to § 1331 for patent litigation raises a question that "leads into one of the darkest corridors of
the law of federal courts and federal jurisdiction").
64, See, e.g., Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505 (1900) (no federal jurisdic-
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example of the latter, Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co.,66 the
Supreme Court upheld the exercise of federal jurisdiction in a suit
where the outcome was determined by the application of federal constitutional law, even though the plaintiff's underlying cause of action
67
was presumably a creation of state corporation law.
In analyzing and applying the tests of American Well Works
and Kansas City Title, attention must be paid to Justice Cardozo's
admonition in Gully v. First National Bank68 to avoid the hazards of
unduly broad and abstract definitions:
What is needed is something of that common-sense accommodation
of judgment to kaleidoscopic situations which characterizes the law
in its treatment of problems of causation. . . .[T]here has been a
selective process which picks the substantial causes out of the web
and lays the other ones aside. As in problems of causation, so here
in the search for the underlying law. If we follow the ascent far
enough, countless claims of right can be discovered to have their
source or their operative limits in the provisions of a federal statute
or in the Constitution itself with its circumambient restrictions
upon legislative power. To set bounds to the pursuit, the courts
have formulated the distinction between controversies that are basic and those that are collateral, between disputes that are necessary and those that are merely possible. We shall be lost in a maze
if we put that compass by.6
Thus, in borderline cases, section 1331 must be interpreted with a
sensitivity to pragmatic considerations of judicial administration and
tion of suit on cause of action created by federal statute but governed entirely by local rules or

customs). See also Keaukaka-Panaewa Community Ass'n v. Hawaiian Homes Comm'n, 588
F.2d 1216, 1226 n.ll (9th Cir. 1978); C.

WRIGHT.

supra note 15, § 17, at 94 & n.21 (both

interpreting Shoshone).
65. Judge Friendly concluded that "[i]t
has come to be realized that Mr. Justice
Holmes' formula is more useful for inclusion than for the exclusion for which it was intended."
T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915
(1965). See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1,9 (1983)

(citing T.B. Harms); C. WRIGHT, supra note 15, § 17, at 94 & n.19. (citing T.B. Harms).
66.

255 U.S. 180 (1921).

67. See id. at 199-202. See also id. at 213-15 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (cause of action
arises under Missouri law); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463

U.S. 1, 9 (1983) (in Kansas City Title, "vindication of a right under state law necessarily
turned on some construction of federal law").

68. 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
69. Id. at 117-18 (citations omitted). See also Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust Fund, 463 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1983) (statutory interpretation in Gully reflects a
"spirit of necessity and careful limitation of district court jurisdiction").
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to the broader concerns of federalism.7 0
I. Remedial Conciliation Agreements Without Incorporation of

Federal Law. - The jurisdictional question is raised in its simplest
form in an action to enforce provisions of an EEOC conciliation
agreement obligating the respondent to take remedial action that is
defined without reference to federal law. For example, in an action
to enforce a conciliation agreement, the EEOC or the alleged discriminatee might allege that the respondent breached the agreement

solely by failing to pay a definite sum of money. 71 Assuming the applicability of state rules of interpretation and performance of contracts, 72 such a claim ordinarily would not require application of the
Kansas City Title test because it would not raise an outcome-determinative question concerning the interpretation or application of provisions of Title VII or other federal law.73 Accordingly, the Ameri70. In Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 8, the Supreme Court noted that "[e]specially
when considered in light of § 1441's removal jurisdiction, the phrase 'arising under' [in §
1331] masks a welter of issues regarding the interrelation of federal and state authority and
the proper management of the federal judicial system." (footnote omitted). One commentator
characterizes the "arising under" standard as "a pragmatic limit upon federal question jurisdiction" that provokes:
inquiries and guesses about such matters as these: the extent of the caseload increase for federal trial courts if jurisdiction is recognized; the extent to which cases
of this class will, in practice, turn on issues of state or federal law; the extent of the
necessity for an expert federal tribunal to handle issues of federal law that do arise;
the extent of the necessity for a sympathetic federal tribunal in cases of this class.
Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement That a Case Arise "Directly" Under Federal Law, 115 U. PENN. L. REV. 890, 916 (1967). See id. at 892-93 (federal forum should be
available to try factual issues on federal claim where state courts are potentially antagonistic);
Town of Greenhorn v. Baker County, 596 F.2d 349, 352-53 & n.lI (9th Cir. 1979) (applying
Cardozo's "common-sense" and Cohen's "pragmatic limits" to find no need for a federal forum in dispute over trust relationship created by federal law); C. WRIGHT, supra note 15, § 17,
at 96 & n.34 ("in the unusual case in which there is a debatable issue about federal question
jurisdiction, pragmatic considerations must be taken into account") (citing Cohen, supra this
note, at 916); A.L.I., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL

COURTS 163 (1969) ("litigation involving civil rights has dramatized the necessity for an independent system of federal courts to vindicate federal law").
71.

See generally 8 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MAN. (BNA) 431:701 (1981) (sample conciliation

agreement; respondent's promise to pay money).
72. This Article rejects the argument that federal common law should displace state
contract law in actions to enforce EEOC conciliation agreements. See infra notes 223-95 and
accompanying text.
73. The question of performance or breach would be resolved through interpretation of
contract provisions that do not incorporate federal law, and through the application of state
contract law to facts. The results of the contract interpretation would define the expectation
interest of the victim of the alleged breach, thus defining the scope of substitutional relief. See
generally E.A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.8, at 838-39 (1982). The respondent could con-

ceivably attack the merits of the underlying, compromised Title VII claim by contending that
the conciliation agreement is not supported by consideration because the claim is groundless
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can Well Works test should determine whether such an action

"arises under" the express provisions of Title VII. Within that
framework, federal jurisdiction depends upon whether the action is
essentially a creation of state contract law or is so strongly rooted in
the substantive provisions of Title VII regarding conciliation that it
is a creation of federal statutory law. 4
The inquiry begins with American Well Works itself. The plaintiff in that case alleged that the defendants had falsely stated that
the plaintiff's pump infringed their patent and that the defendants
had sued or threatened to sue users of the plaintiff's pump.7 5 After

removal from state court, the federal trial court dismissed the action
on the ground that it arose under the federal patent laws and there-

fore rested within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts, depriving the federal court of derivative removal jurisdiction.7 6 The Supreme Court reversed.7 Writing for the Court, Justice Holmes
concluded that an action for injury caused either by a threat to sue
under federal patent laws or by a representation of patent infringe-

ment "is not itself a suit under the patent law."178 Drawing support
from a comparative reference to a contract action,7 9 Justice Holmes

stated that the question whether such threats or statements are
wrongful "depends upon the law of the state where the act is done,
not upon the patent law," even though the defendants could raise
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 74
(1981); Fiege v. Boehm, 210 Md. 352, 123 A.2d 316 (Md. Ct. App. 1956). However, even
that contention would not require an accurate construction of the federal statute, but only a
determination of whether the Title VII claim was legally or factually uncertain or whether the
claimant had a good-faith belief in the potential merit of the claim. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 74 (1981). That limited inquiry does not implicate sufficiently strong
federal interests to invoke the doctrine of Kansas City Title.
74. See generally supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
75. American Well Works, 241 U.S. at 258-59 (1916).
76. Id. at 258. The procedural posture of the case is explained in M. REDISH, supra note
63, at 65 n.83:
The specific issue in the case was whether the action could properly be removed to
federal court. Under the applicable legal principles, if the case could not have been
properly brought originally in state court, the case could not be removed, even if the
case could have been brought originally in federal court.
Id. (citation omitted).
77. American Well Works, 241 U.S. at 260. Presumably, the Supreme Court's reversal
obligated the federal trial court to remand the action to state court, rather than to dismiss. See
C. WRIGHT, supra note 15, § 41.
78. American Well Works, 241 U.S. at 259-60.
79. Holmes concluded that "'[t]he fact that the justification may involve the validity and
infringement of a patent is no more material to the question under what law the suit is brought
than it would be in an action of contract." Id. at 260.

and was asserted in bad faith. See generally RESTATEMENT

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1985

15

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 2

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:257

defenses based upon the validity and infringement of their patent.8 0
Because state tort law created the cause of action for "slander of
title," the suit arose under state law.81
This decision has important implications in actions seeking enforcement of remedial conciliation agreements in which the respondent's obligations are defined without reference to federal law. In
rejecting the trial court's finding of federal jurisdiction in American
Well Works Co., Holmes did not explicitly interpret the specific language of any jurisdictional statute.8 2 Federal statutes at that time
conferred upon federal courts original jurisdiction of actions "arising
under" the federal patent and copyright laws, 83 and made such jurisdiction exclusive of the state courts.8 4 Justice Holmes' implicit interpretation of the "arising under" language of the statute granting
patent jurisdiction8" has been characterized as "the most familiar
definition" of the same statutory phrase in the general federal question statute, section 1331.86 Because the current statutory grant of
federal jurisdiction over patent and copyright litigation (section 1338
of 28 U.S.C.) 8 7 retains the "arising under" language of its predecessor, cases applying the American Well Works test to the section
Id. at 259-60. If questions concerning the scope and validity of the defendants' patWorks could
have been decided on the basis of the well-pleaded complaint rule. See supra note 57. However, Holmes did not rely on that rule; the opinion ascribes no special significance to the possibility that the federal questions might be raised only in an affirmative defense. See American
Well Works, 241 U.S. at 259-60. One commentator argues that, in any event, the issue of the
validity of the defendants' patents in a trade libel suit would be properly alleged in the complaint as a part of the plaintiff's cause of action. Cohen, supra note 70, at 897.
81. American Well Works, 241 U.S. at 260.
82. Justice Holmes defined the term "arises under," but cited to no jurisdictional statute. See Id. at 260.
83. Federal district courts were granted original jurisdiction "[o]f all suits at law or in
equity arising under the patent, the copyright, and the trade-mark laws." Act of Mar. 3, 1911,
ch. 231, § 24, 7, 36 Stat. 1092 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 41(7) (1940)).
84. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 256, 15, 36 Stat. 1160-61 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §
371(5) (1940)).
85. The Court's opinion reflects awareness of the statutory grant of exclusive jurisdiction
in patent cases. American Well Works, 241 U.S. at 258. In addition, the opinion contains
Justice Holmes' now-famous definition of the statutory "arising under" language: "A suit
arises under the law that creates the cause of action." Id. at 260.
86. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8 (1983).
87. Section 1338 of title 28 provides in relevant part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under
any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and
trade-marks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent, plant variety protection and copyright cases.
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1982).
80.

cnt rights could be raised only in an affirmative defense, then American Well
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1338 "arising under" clause continue to provide guidance in interpreting the section 1331 language.88

In T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu,89 for example, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a dismissal for lack
of federal jurisdiction in a suit for equitable and declaratory relief on
a contractual assignment of renewal copyrights. 90 Circuit Judge

Friendly refined Holmes' test and adapted it to actions involving
copyrights, explaining that "an action 'arises under' the Copyright
Act if . . the complaint is for a remedy expressly granted by the

Act, e.g., a suit for infringement or for the statutory royalties for
record reproduction." 91 Applying that standard, the court determined that the federal copyright laws do not expressly or implicitly
create a cause of action to enforce or rescind assignments of copy-

rights or to fix the locus of ownership. 92 Although the federal copyright statute expressly authorizes assignment of an interest in copy-

right, 93 it neither authorizes a suit for enforcement of the assignment
nor provides a remedy for breach. 94 Thus, the cause of action was
created by state law and would turn "on the facts or on ordinary
principles of contract law." 95 Judge Friendly did not apply Holmes'
88. Section 1338, like its predecessor, provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction of patent
and copyright cases, supra note 84, while general federal question jurisdiction under § 1331
presumptively is concurrent with that of the state courts, see generally C. WRIGHT, supra note
15, § 10, at 35-36, thus potentially raising different concerns of federalism. The "arising
under" language of § 1338(a) arguably should be interpreted more broadly than the same
phrase in § 1331, because the exclusivity of the jurisdictional grant in § 1338(a) apparently
reflects congressional recognition of a special need for a sympathetic and expert federal forum
for cases involving patents and copyrights. See generally Cohen, supra note 70, at 907. A more
compelling argument is that the phrase "arising under" should be interpreted more narrowly
in § 1338(a) than in § 1331, because state courts are deprived of even concurrent jurisdiction
of cases falling within § 1338(a). See T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 826 (2d Cir.
1964) (stating "the case for an unexpansive reading" of § 1338(a)), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915
(1965); Chisum, supra note 63, at 671 (examining suggestion in T.B. Harms that test for
concurrent jurisdiction under § 1331 could be more easily satisfied than test for exclusive
jurisdiction under § 1338). The second argument simply calls for supplementation of the
American Well Works with that of Kansas City Title in appropriate cases, see infra notes 12766 and accompanying text, rather than for varying application of the American Well Works
test. See e.g., T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 827; Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers
Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983).
89. 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965).
90. Id. at 824-25.
91. Id. at 828 (citations omitted).
92. Id. at 827.
93. 17 U.S.C. § 28 (1976) (recodified in 17 U.S.C. §§ 201(d), 204 (1982)).
94. T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 827.
95. Id. at 826. See also Arvin Indus., Inc. v. Berns Air King Corp., 510 F.2d 1070 (7th
Cir. 1975) (no federal jurisdiction in action to enforce license agreement arising out of consent
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test mechanically. The result in T.B. Harms is based partly on the
perceived absence of a strong national interest in a dispute over
property or contract rights in patents or copyrights. 6
The Ninth Circuit has applied Judge Friendly's formulation to
two actions involving copyrights, and a comparison of these two
cases provides insight into the jurisdictional determinations. In Topolos v. Caldeway,97 a suit for damages and injunctive relief for
copyright infringement arose under the federal Copyright Act, which
created the cause of action and the remedy, even though the action

presented a threshold question of state contract law to determine
ownership of the copyright. 98 In Dolch v. United CaliforniaBank,99
on the other hand, a suit to rescind a gratuitous assignment of renewal copyrights arose under state contract law, even though the
federal Copyright Act expressly permits assignment of copyrights by
written instrument. 100 An EEOC conciliation agreement that does
not incorporate federal law is analytically analogous to an agreement
transferring an interest in a patent or copyright, and a suit to enforce such an agreement is more nearly analogous to T.B. Harms
and Dolch than it is to Topolos.101 It is not enough for Holmes' test
decree in patent infringement action); Kysor Indus. Corp. v. Pet, Inc., 459 F.2d 1010 (6th
Cir.) (no federal jurisdiction in action to enforce agreement settling patent infringement suit),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 980 (1972). Cf. Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local Div. 1285, Amalagamated Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15 (1982) (claims for breach of a collective bargaining agreement between union and local government transit authority and for breach of an arrangement
mandated by § 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transp. Act of 1964 were state contract claims);
Nieto-Santos v. Fletcher Farms, 743 F.2d 638, 640-41 (9th Cir. 1984).
96. T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 826 ("the federal grant of a patent or copyright has not
been thought to infuse with any national interest a dispute as to ownership or contractual
enforcement turning on the facts or on ordinary principles of contract law"). See id. at 828
(insufficient federal interest to warrant development and application of federal common law).
Cf. Cohen, supra note 70, at 907 (criticizing American Well Works for failing to vindicate
federal interest in patent litigation). See also EEOC v. Liberty Trucking Co., 528 F. Supp.
610, 618 (W.D. Wis. 1981) (conflict with federal policy is not likely with state interpretation
of narrowly drafted conciliation agreement designed only to give relief to individual), rev'd,
695 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1982).
97. 698 F.2d 991 (9th Cir. 1983).
98. Id. at 993-95.
99. 702 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1983).
100. Id. at 180-81. The court held that "whether an assignment of renewal rights without consideration is a valid assignment is a state law question." Id. at 180.
101. In Dolch, the court held that the only true issues in the case involved principles of
state law. The plaintiff in Dolch had brought suit to contest the validity of an assignment of
renewed copyrights, based on a claim of lack of consideration. 702 F.2d at 179. The plaintiff
alleged that her suit arose under the copyright statute because the statute specifically provides
for the assignment of copyrights. Id. at 179-80. The Ninth Circuit held, however, that although the assignability of renewal copyrights may be a question of federal law, the conditions
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of federal jurisdiction that Title VII expressly authorizes the conciliation process out of which the agreement arises, 0 2 or that the sub-

ject matter of the agreement is the compromise of a Title VII
claim. 10 3 The critical factor is the absence from Title VII of any
federal right of action or remedy for breach of a conciliation agreement.104 The statute contains no express provision for such a right of

action or remedy.'0 5 Although an unexpressed congressional intent to
provide a federal right of action or remedy may sometimes be inferred from congressional creation of federal duties and correlative
rights, 0 6 Title VII does not supply the necessary basis for recognizfor a valid assignment are a matter of state law; because the cause of action did not involve
any questions of interpretation or policy under the copyright laws, it did not arise under the
copyright laws and federal jurisdiction to decide the matter did not exist. Id. at 180-81.
In Topolos, the plaintiff brought suit in federal district court seeking damages and injunctive relief for statutory copyright infringement, unfair competition and breach of contract. 698
F.2d at 992. The district court held that the principal and controlling issue was the ownership
of the copyright. Because the issue required the court to determine the rights and obligations
of the plaintiff and defendant under the publishing contract, the district court concluded that
the case arose under state law and that it therefore lacked jurisdiction. See id. at 993. The
Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that while the ownership of the copyright may have been a
threshold question, it was not the only question; once ownership of the copyright was established, the court explained, the copyright infringement claim would still require resolution, and
should properly be determined by a federal court. Id. at 994.
102. Cf. Dolch v. United Cal. Bank, 702 F.2d 178, 181 (9th Cir. 1983) (federal statute
authorizes copyright assignment, but doesn't create cause of action to rescind assignment for
want of consideration); T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 827 (2d Cir. 1964) (federal statute authorizes copyright assignment, but doesn't create cause of action to enforce assignment).
103. Cf.Topolos v. Caldewey, 698 F.2d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 1983) ("a case does not arise
under the federal copyright laws. . . merely because the subject matter of the action involves
or affects a copyright"); Graf v. Elgin, Joliet and E. Ry., 697 F.2d 771, 776 (7th Cir. 1983)
(suit to enforce a collective bargaining agreement in railroad industry does not arise under the
Railway Labor Act merely because that federal statute regulates collective bargaining within
the industry).
104. See T.B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 828 (under the American Well Works test, an action
arises under the Copyright Act if it seeks a remedy expressly granted by the Act). See also
Local Div. 732, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth.,
667 F.2d 1327, 1340-44 (lth Cir. 1982) (right to a remedy for breach of an agreement
mandated by federal statute is a common law right of action of which § 1331 does not grant
jurisdiction).
105. EEOC v. Liberty Trucking Co., 695 F.2d 1038, 1040 (7th Cir. 1982) ("Title VII
does not explicitly provide the EEOC with the authority to seek enforcement of conciliation
agreements in the federal courts"). Title VII expressly creates rights in both the EEOC and
victims of discrimination to bring a "civil action," but only in the event that conciliation has
failed. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982). The companion relief provision is limited to cases in
which a court has made a finding of an unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)
(1982). Breach of a conciliation agreement is not among the unlawful employment practices
described in Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3 (1982).
106. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) (recognizing implied private right of action to enforce express federal statutory declaration that
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ing an implied federal right of action or remedy because it imposes
no duty on a party to enter into 0 7 or to perform 08 a conciliation
agreement.

09

Furthermore, because a suit to enforce an EEOC conciliation
agreement does not seek a remedy for adjudicated discrimination," a0
but rather seeks to vindicate expectations generated by contractual
promises,"' lack of federal jurisdiction is consistent with respective
federal and state interests. Just as enforcement of the conciliation

agreement plays an important role in implementing the important
national policy of eliminating discrimination," 2 requiring the enforcement suit to be brought in state court furthers the important
and distinct state interest of protecting contractual expectations
within the state." 3z These goals do not conflict.
Consider, for example, a suit by Employee against Employer to
enforce Employer's promises in an EEOC conciliation agreement to
contracts formed or performed in violation of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 shall be
void); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (recognizing implied private
right of action to enforce express federal statutory prohibition of sex discrimination in educational programs receiving federal financial assistance).
107. See, e.g., EEOC v. Liberty Trucking Co., 695 F.2d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 1982)
(citing to other federal decisions for the proposition that Title VII does not compel any party
"to reach final agreement").
108. Title VII does not provide that failure to perform a conciliation agreement is an
unlawful employment practice. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3 (1982).
109. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 569 (1979):
It is true that in the past our cases have held that in certain circumstances a private
right of action may be implied in a statute not expressly providing one. But in those
cases finding such implied private remedies, the statute in question at least prohibited certain conduct or created federal rights in favor of private parties. [citations
omitted]. By contrast, § 17(a) [of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934] neither
confers rights on private parties nor proscribes any conduct as unlawful.
Id. See also Pavolini v. Bard-Air Corp., 645 F.2d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 1981) ("[tihere must be a
duty, the violation of which has caused injury, before we reach the question whether a private
remedy exists to redress that injury") (citation omitted). Cf. Local Div. 732, Amalgamated
Transit Union v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 667 F.2d 1327, 1333 (1Ith Cir.
1982) (focusing analysis on implicit grant of jurisdiction rather than on implicit creation of
right of action in suit to enforce agreement mandated by Urban Mass Transportation Act of
1964).
110. By definition, a conciliation agreement is reached without an adjudication of discrimination. See supra note 6. Indeed, the respondent typically denies in the conciliation
agreement that it has engaged in unlawful discrimination. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
Ill. See, e.g., E. A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.1, at 812-13 (1982).
112. See supra note 23.
113. Cf. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 512 (1983) ("[federal labor law interests],
on the one hand, and the interest of the State in providing a remedy to its citizens for breach
of contract, on the other, are 'discrete' concerns") (citation omitted)).
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pay Employee a definite sum of money and to hire Employee for a
designated position at the first available opening. Upon a finding of
breach, a state court applying general common law principles would
routinely award Employee compensatory damages designed to compensate her fully for her lost expectations.11 4 Many state courts
would be reluctant, however, to grant specific enforcement of the
Employer's contractual promise to hire Employee. 115 Federal courts,

in contrast, have shown a general willingness to grant liberal affirmative relief, such as reinstatement or hiring, as a "make whole" remedy for unlawful discrimination under Title VII." 6s Federal courts
have granted this type of relief, however, only upon a judicial finding
that the respondent has committed an unlawful employment practice. 1 7 An action to enforce contractual promises in a conciliation
114. See, e.g., 4 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 958 (1963); 5 A. CORBIN, supra,
at § 1095. See also E. A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.8, at 839 (1982) (limitations on
damage awards "often hold the injured party to a more objective valuation of his
expectation").
115. See, e.g., EEOC v. Liberty Trucking Co., 695 F.2d 1038, 1043 (7th Cir. 1982)
(citing 81 C.J.S. Specific Performance § 96 (Supp. 1982)); Robinson v. Computer Servicenters, 346 So. 2d 940 (Ala. 1977); Burns v. Gould, 172 Conn. 210, 374 A.2d 193 (1977);
Fran Realty, Inc. v. Thomas, 30 Md. App. 362, 354 A.2d 196 (1976); American Broadcasting
Companies, Inc. v. Wolf, 76 A.D.2d 162, 430 N.Y.S.2d 275, appeal dismissed 51 N.Y.2d 835,
413 N.E.2d 1173, 433 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1980), afid, 52 N.Y.2d 394, 420 N.E.2d 363, 438
N.Y.S.2d 482 (1981). But cf. State ex rel. Wright v. Weyandt, 50 Ohio St.2d 194, 363
N.E.2d 1387 (Ohio 1977) (specifically enforcing reinstatement provision in a settlement agreement in which employee relinquished a statutorily-created right to reinstatement based on judicially affirmed order of state administrative board).
A popular explanation for judicial reluctance to specifically enforce an employment contract on behalf of the employee is the difficulty and expense of supervising a court order that
compels the continued association of the parties "after disputes have arisen . . . and confidence and loyalty have been destroyed." 5A A. CORBIN. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1204, at
401-02 (1964 & Supp. 1971). See Kronman, Specific Performance,45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351,
357 n.26, 373 (1978).
116. See, e.g., Taylor v. Teletype Corp., 648 F.2d 1129, 1138-39 (8th Cir. 1981) (reinstatement of employee is proper despite hostility between employer and employee engendered
during litigation), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 969 (1981). See also Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co.,
424 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1976) (approving in some circumstances seniority relief as well as instatement for victims of hiring discrimination); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
419-21 (1975) (legislative history of 1972 amendments to Title VII demonstrates importance
of a complete "make whole" remedy; district courts have broad equitable powers, and a qualified duty, to supplement injunctive relief with backpay); Locke v. Kansas City Power & Light
Co., 660 F.2d 359, 368-69 (8th Cir. 1981) (in appropriate circumstances trial court can order
instatement of victim of hiring discrimination to a position higher than normal entry level).
But cf., e.g., Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 717 F.2d 114, 120-21 (4th Cir. 1983) (reviewing
"rightful place" doctrine, which limits specific relief to avoid "bumping" innocent, incumbent
employees); George v. Farmers Elec. Coop., 715 F.2d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1983) (denying reinstatement in "truly unique case").
117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982) provides:
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agreement does not require proof of illegal discrimination. 118 The
difference in the willingness of state and federal courts to require
employers to rehire employees is not due to state hostility toward

EEOC conciliation agreements, 119 but stems instead from this fundamental difference between an action to enforce contractual expectations and an action to remedy a proven violation of Title VII. The
particularly liberal provisions in Title VII for specific relief should
not apply automatically
to an action to enforce an EEOC concilia1 20
tion agreement.
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally
engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court
may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice,
and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is
not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the case may
be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable relief
as the court deems appropriate.
Id.
118. See supra note 73.
119. The reluctance of state courts to grant specific enforcement of employment contracts stems from characteristics common to all employment relations, not just those disrupted
by invidious discrimination. See supra note 115; EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 714 F.2d 567,
573 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2384 (1984). The States may not have a substantial interest in enforcing all federal laws. See, e.g., Olguin v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co.,
740 F.2d 1468, 1475 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Arizona has little interest in enforcing federal [mine
safety] law"). However, the states surely are not so hostile to federal anti-discrimination laws
that they would enforce an EEOC conciliation agreement with any less vigor than they would
a commercial contract. See generally Wright, In Praise of State Courts: Confessions of a
Federal Judge, 11 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 165, 181-88 (1984). Indeed, most states have formally expressed a policy of nondiscrimination in employment. The District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and forty-three states have enacted gefieral employment discrimination statutes with prohibitions similar to those in Title VII. 1 FRES JOB DISCRIMINATION
MANUAL 5, 13, 24, 41, 52, 68, 77, 89, 110, 119, 126, 142, 150, 162, 174, 189, 202, 213, 225,
238, 253, 261, 271, 283, 293, 302, 316, 324, 342, 354, 367, 381, 394, 400, 410, 424, 433, 446,
458, 465, 473, 483, 493, 503 (1983). North Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi, and Virginia have
enacted similar statutes that apply to state employers. Id. at 99, 253, 341, 473. In addition,
North Carolina legislation expresses a public policy of comprehensive equal employment opportunity. Id. at 341. Alabama, Arkansas, and Louisiana have no legislation expressing a public policy of comprehensive equal employment opportunity; however, each has enacted more
limited protective legislation, id. at 4, 24, 189, and Louisiana has judicially expressed a policy
of equal employment oppoitunity. Gil v. Metal Service Corp., 412 So. 2d 706, 708 (La. Ct.
App.) (dictum) (employer may not terminate an at-will employee because of race, sex, or
religious beliefs), cert. denied, 414 So. 2d 379 (La. 1982).
120. The Ohio Supreme Court has approved specific enforcement of a contractual promise of reinstatement in a settlement agreement. State ex rel.Wright v. Weyandt, 50 Ohio St.
2d 194, 363 N.E.2d 1387 (1977). Significantly, however, the employer's promise of reinstatement had been contractually exchanged for the employee's relinquishment of a statutory right
to reinstatement based on the judicially affirmed order of a state administrative board, which
could otherwise have been enforced through a judicial writ of mandamus. Id. at 1389-90. The
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Alleged discriminatees who claim to be victims of a respondent's breach of a conciliation agreement can take advantage of Title VII's liberal remedial provisions by suing directly on the underlying Title VII claim and proving illegal discrimination. EEOC
conciliation agreements should expressly condition the surrender of
underlying Title VII claims upon the respondent's performance of its
contractual obligations. 1 2 1 If the respondent breaches the conciliation

agreement, the EEOC or the alleged discriminatees can then sue on
the underlying Title VII claim,"' joining a claim for breach of the
employees had not merely compromised a tenable but unadjudicated claim; they had presented
the claim to a hearing body created by the legislature and had established the legal and factual basis for invoking a legislative exception to the general policy against judicially enforced
reinstatement. See id. In contrast, an EEOC conciliation agreement follows a finding by the
EEOC of reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true. See supra note 6. This preliminary finding is not an adjudication of unlawful discrimination. See EEOC v. Liberty Trucking
Co., 695 F.2d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 1982) (Congress rejected proposal to give EEOC adjudicative powers similar to those of the National Labor Relations Board). It is instead a determination by the EEOC that "the claim has sufficient merit to warrant litigation if the matter is not
thereafter conciliated by the Commission or the charging party." 3 E.E.O.C. COMPL. MAN.
(BNA) § 40.1 (1979). A federal court may specifically enforce a settlement that is incorporated in a consent decree without an adjudication on the merits of the compromised claim. See
United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 439-40 (5th Cir. 1981). That does not suggest,
however, that the settlement agreement alone would be specifically enforceable, because "[a]
consent decree, although founded on the agreement of the parties, is a judgment" with
"greater finality than a compact," and "may be enforced by judicial sanctions, including citation for contempt." Id. (citations and footnotes omitted). See also Turner v. Orr, 759 F.2d
817, 825-26 (11 th Cir. 1985); City of Las Vegas v. Clark County, 755 F.2d 697, 701 (9th Cir.
1985); 2 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 56.43, at 11-84.38 to 1184.39 (1983).
121. See supra note 28. Cf.Belknap, Inc., v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 503-4 (1983) (encouraging employers to impose express condition on their contractual obligations to retain "permanent" replacements of strikers).
122. Perdue v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 690 F.2d 1091, 1095-96 (4th Cir. 1982)
(Widener, J., dissenting).
Such a suit is not subject to any limitations period running from the date of the alleged
discrimination to the time of filing suit. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 36672 (1977); EEOC v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 735 F.2d 69, 73 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 307 (1984). However, the respondent may raise the equitable defense of
laches. See id.; Boone v. Mechanical Specialties Co., 609 F.2d 956, 958-59 (9th Cir. 1979).
The doctrine of laches presumably would not bar suit against the respondent if the respondent
delayed the suit by first entering into a settlement agreement and then breached that agreement. See, e.g., Covelo Indian Community v. Watt, 551 F. Supp. 366, 381 n.12 (D.D.C. 1982)
(defendant was guilty of "foot-dragging" and therefore could not assert defense of laches)..
The alleged discriminatees must bring suit within 90 days of notice from the EEOC of
their right to sue. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982). However, the EEOC would not have
issued a notice of right to sue at the time of successful conciliation. See id. It can, and should,
issue such notice after confirming that the respondent has breached the conciliation agreement
and deciding that it will not bring suit itself. See Perdue v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 690
F.2d at 1093-96 (Widener, J., dissenting) (suggesting that alleged discriminatees join EEOC
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conciliation agreement as a pendent state contract claim. 123 In that
way, a single federal court can adjudicate both claims. If the plaintiff can prove discrimination on the underlying Title VII claim, the
court may order specific relief with the liberality contemplated by
the express provisions of Title VII. 124 Even if the Title VII claim
fails, the plaintiff may still establish a breach of the conciliation
agreement 2 5 and the right to seek a monetary remedy designed to
protect contractual expectations under state law.' 26 The court can
fashion a remedy that avoids double recovery to a plaintiff that succeeds on both claims.
In sum, when an action to enforce a conciliation agreement does
not require construction of the express provisions of Title VII, the
action does not "arise under" the provisions of Title VII within the
meaning of section 1331. Consequently, federal courts have no jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. Enforcement by state courts under
state principles of contract law is appropriate, and is consistent with
federal interests in the conciliation process.
2. Conciliation Agreements Incorporating Title VII Duties.
The jurisdictional question is more difficult to resolve in an action
brought to enforce provisions of a conciliation agreement that incorporates the substantive prohibitions of Title VII. 127 In many conciliation agreements, the respondent agrees to remedy the alleged discrimination that is the subject of the EEOC charge, and also to
as a defendant to compel it to issue notice of right to sue, if necessary).
123. Supra note 15. In a suit in federal court against the state as employer, the eleventh
amendment may deprive the court of jurisdiction to hear the pendent contract claim unless the
state has waived its sovereign immunity. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89 (1984). On the other hand, federal jurisdiction of the Title VII claim may be exclusive. See infra note 170. Therefore, in suits against the state, the plaintiff may have to split his
Title VII and contract claims between separate actions in state and federal court.
124. Supra note 117 and accompanying text.
125. See generally supra note 73. The district court will most likely retain jurisdiction
of the pendent contract claim if it dismisses the Title VII claim after, rather than before, trial
on the merits. See, e.g., United Beverage Co. v. Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 760
F.2d 155, 160 (7th Cir. 1985). Nonetheless, "[a]lthough federal courts have been encouraged
to dismiss pendent state claims if all federal claims are resolved before trial, the decision to
retain jurisdiction over a remaining state claim is within the discretion of the district court."
Rutledge v. Aluminum Workers Int'l Union, 737 F.2d 965, 970 (11 th Cir. 1984) (footnote and
citations omitted). Dismissal of a state pendent claim presumably would be an abuse of that
discretion if the statute of limitations barred refiling in state court. See United Beverage, 760
F.2d at 160.
126. Supra note 114.
127. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER's
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 883 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as
HART AND WECHSLER].
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refrain from committing other specified violations of Title VII during the term of the agreement. 2 If the plaintiff alleges that the de-

fendant breached the agreement by committing new violations of Title VII, the court may be called upon to construe the incorporated

federal law to determine whether the defendant breached contractual duties.' 29 If so, a federal district court arguably has original
subject matter jurisdiction of the action under the doctrine of Smith
v. Kansas City Title and Trust Co.,'

0

even though the cause of ac-

tion is created by state contract law under the standards announced
in American Well Works. 13 Close examination reveals, however,
that federal courts do not have jurisdiction of such actions, because
the exercise of jurisdiction in these circumstances would not further
important policies of Title VII.
In Smith v. Kansas City Title and Trust Co., 3 2 a corporate
shareholder sued to enjoin the corporation and its officers, agents and
employees from investing corporate funds in farm loan bonds issued
by federal banks under the authority of the Federal Farm Loan Act
of July 17, 1916, and its amendments. a 3 The shareholder argued
that the Act was unconstitutional and that the corporation thus
lacked authority under Missouri law to invest in the bonds. 34 The
Supreme Court stated that, as a general rule, a federal district court
128. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
129. The parties to a conciliation agreement would be free to describe the respondent's
contractual duties without reference to federal law, even though the described duties appear to
be substantially identical to the mandates of federal law. See, e.g., Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 39 (1974) (collective bargaining agreement obligated the employer
to refrain from discriminating "on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or ancestry," but did not refer to Title VII). In a suit to enforce such an agreement, the court could
find that the parties intended the scope of the contractual duty to be different from the statutory duty. See generally E. A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 7.9, 7.10 (1982) (discussing fundamental principles of contract interpretation). In such a case, the action would not require
interpretation of the federal law. This does not appear to be the pattern in EEOC conciliation
agreements, however; contractual duties to refrain from discriminating during the term of the
agreement are typically expressed by direct reference to provisions of Title VII. See supra note
32. In those circumstances, the court could easily find that the parties intended to incorporate
the statutory duties, requiring an interpretation of the statutory language.
130. 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
131. American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916). See, e.g.,
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1983); T.B.
Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965).
Both cases consider whether federal jurisdiction exists under Kansas City Title doctrine, even
though state law created the cause of action under Holmes' test.
132. 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
133. Id. at 195.
134. Id. at 195-96, 199; see id. at 214 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (the scope of the directors' duty "depends upon the charter of their corporation and other laws of Missouri").
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has jurisdiction of an action in which it appears from the complaint
that the plaintiff's "right to relief depends upon the construction or
application of the Constitution or laws of the United States."' 35 The
Court held that the predecessor to section 1331136 conferred federal
jurisdiction in the shareholder suit, because the constitutionality of a
congressional act was "directly drawn in question" and was outcome
37

determinative.
Justice Holmes, dissenting in Kansas City Title, complained
that the Court's decision represented an unwarranted departure from
the test that he announced in American Well Works.'38 Holmes argued that the shareholder's cause of action to enjoin the corporation
from making illegal or unauthorized investments was wholly a creation of state law, and that state adoption of federal constitutionality,
as a test of corporate investment authority, should not cause the suit

to arise under the applicable constitutional provision." 9
The broad jurisdictional approach endorsed in Kansas City Title was challenged thirteen years later in Moore v. Chesapeake &
Ohio Railway. 4" There, an employee of an interstate railroad
brought suit under a Kentucky statute for injuries he sustained while
engaged in intrastate commerce.' 4 ' The Kentucky statute incorporated duties and correlative rights created by the Federal Safety Appliance Acts, raising questions about the construction of the federal
Acts. 142 The Court characterized these as "federal questions" that
135. Id. at 199.
136. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction.. .. where the matter in controversy. . . arises under the Constitution or laws of the United States." Act of Mar. 3, 1911,
ch. 231, § 24, 5 1, 36 Stat. 1092 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 41(1) (1940)).
137. Kansas City Title, 255 U.S. at 201.
138. Id. at 213-15 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 214-15 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
140. 291 US. 205 (1934).
141. Id. at 207-08.
142. Id. at 212-13. In defining the carriers' liability for negligence, the Kentucky statute
arguably did not incorporate federal law, but created an independent state standard based on
the language of a federal statute: "The statute of Kentucky. . .reproduced in substance, and
with almost literal exactness, the corresponding provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability
Act." Id. at 212. On that theory, the state statute could be construed independently of the
federal law, and no federal question would be presented, obviating application of the Kansas
City Title doctrine. Cf. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Division of Indus. Safety, 633 F.2d 814, 816
(9th Cir. 1980) (scope of FAA authority might not be conclusive in construction of state requirement of "active exercise" of FAA authority), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 944 (1981). The
Kentucky statute directly incorporated federal law by abrogating the doctrines of contributory
negligence and assumption of risk in any case in which the carrier's violation of a state or
federal safety statute, including the Federal Safety Appliance Acts, contributed to the employee's injury or death. Moore, 291 U.S. at 212-13. But a question under the Federal Safety

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol13/iss2/2

26

19851

Calleros: Reconciling the Goals of Federalism with the Policy of Title VII:
TITLE VII SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

could be reviewed by the Supreme Court on direct appeal from the
state courts,' 4 3 but held that the underlying suit was not one arising

under the laws of the United States for purposes of original federal
jurisdiction in the district courts.4 The reasoning of the Court is
more compatible with American Well Works than it is with Kansas
City Title. The federal Acts prescribed duties and created correlative rights, but "did not attempt to lay down rules governing actions

for enforcing these rights"; 145 instead, the right146 to recover damages
for breach of duty was provided by state law.
The decision in Moore appears to endorse Holmes' "creation"
test and to raise questions about the continued vitality of Kansas
City Title. Indeed, in several cases since Moore, federal circuit

courts have ignored the majority opinion in Kansas City Title and
have cited Justice Holmes' dissent as authority for the proposition

that incorporation of federal standards into state law does not create
grounds for federal jurisdiction. 47 Yet the Supreme Court recently
noted in dictum that Holmes' test "has been rejected as an exclusionary principle," and acknowledged Kansas City Title as an estab-

lished supplement to Holmes' test.14 8 Nonetheless, exercise of origi-

nal federal jurisdiction over every state-created cause of action that
incorporates a potential federal question, regardless of how trivial or
Appliance Acts would arguably be raised only in response to a defense to an action brought
under the Kentucky statute, thus precluding federal jurisdiction under the well-pleaded complaint rule. See supra note 57. The Court, however, expressly relied on neither of those arguments to reject federal jurisdiction in Moore; rather, it relied on the absence in the federal
statute of a provision for a right to recover damages. Moore, 291 U.S. at 215.
143. Moore, 291 U.S. at 214.
144. Id. at 215-17.
145. Id. at 215.
146. Id. at 215-16.
147. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Coastal Petroleum Co., 671 F.2d 419, 424 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 970 (1982); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Division of Indus. Safety, 633
F.2d 814, 816 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 944 (1981). See also Buethe v. Britt
Airlines, Inc., 749 F.2d 1235, 1239 (7th Cir. 1984); Nuclear Eng'g Co. v. Scott, 660 F.2d 241,
249 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 993 (1982)(citing United Air Lines); Till v.
Unifirst Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 653 F.2d 152, 155 n.2 (5th Cir. 1981) (dictum); Lowe v.
General Motors Corp., 624 F.2d 1373, 1379 (5th Cir. 1980) (violation of federal statute was
only evidence of negligence under state law); C. WRIGHr, supra note 15, § 17, at 96 ("In the
absence of holdings applying this broader understanding of what is a federal question, which
rests on a single old Supreme Court decision [Kansas City Title], it is difficult to say when or
whether the scope of the jurisdiction will be expanded on [the Kansas City Title] theory.");
Hirshman, Whose Law is it Anyway? A Reconsideration of Federal Question Jurisdiction
Over Cases of Mixed State and FederalLaw, 60 IND. L.J. 17, 72 (1985) (proposing a return
"to the straightforward analysis set forth by Justice Holmes").
148. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983).
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tentative, is inconsistent with repeated admonitions by the Supreme
Court and commentators that section 1331 must be narrowly construed in light of pragmatic considerations and principles of federalism.' 49 Accordingly, application of the Kansas City Title doctrine
should be limited to cases where the outcome of a state-created
claim depends upon resolution of a federal question in which there is
a significant federal interest, thus justifying the addition to the federal caseload and the corresponding diminution in the exercise of
state judicial power. 150
Such a standard is consistent with the result and rationale in
Kansas City Title. The Court in Kansas City Title carefully noted
that the federal question was outcome determinative;151 moreover,
the decision can be justified by pragmatic considerations. The constitutional issues forming the core of the litigation required an expert
and sympathetic federal forum, 152 and sustaining federal jurisdiction
in that class of cases was not likely to "add significantly to the work53
load of an overburdened federal judiciary."
The need for pragmatic limitations on the Kansas City Title
doctrine is particularly strong in some actions to enforce private contracts, such as EEOC conciliation agreements that measure a party's
obligation by reference to federal law. Otherwise, nondiverse, private
contracting parties could secure a federal forum for their contract
disputes merely by incorporating federal questions into their contracts, thus opening the federal courts to a potential flood of litigation in which there is little federal interest. 54 Assuming that remain149.

See, e.g., id. at 2852-53 (statutory interpretation in Gully v. First Nat'l Bank re-

flects a "spirit of necessity and careful limitation of district court jurisdiction"). See supra
notes 48, 69-70 and accompanying text.
150. See generally Cohen, supra note 70, at 905-16; Barnhart v. Brinegar, 362 F. Supp.
464, 476 (W.D. Mo. 1973) (rejecting application of Kansas City Title in light of congressional
intent to leave interpretation and implementation of federal policy primarily to administrative

agency); C. WRIGHT, supra note 15, § 17, at 96 ("may be some room for finding federal
jurisdiction" to resolve "important question of federal law").
151. The Court noted that "[t]he decision depends upon the determination of this issue." Kansas City Title, 255 U.S. at 201. See T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827
(2d Cir. 1964) ("pivotal" federal question), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965).
152. Cohen, supra note 70, at 906. A finding of unconstitutionality by the Missouri

courts, unless reversed on direct review by the United States Supreme Court, presumably
would halt the activities of the affected federal banks in MissourL
153.

Id. Cf. Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 291 U.S. 205 (1934); Cohen, supra note

70, at 912 (Moore presented a substantial risk of flooding the federal courts with personal
injury actions).
154. See Cohen, supra note 70, at 910. For example, employment contracts not governed by federal labor law could raise federal questions under an unrestricted Kansas City
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ing legal issues would be governed by state contract law, 5 the bulk
of the litigation ordinarily would not require the special expertise or
sympathy to federal claims associated with a federal forum. 15 6
While it may seem appropriate, at first glance, to permit a federal court to exercise original subject matter jurisdiction of an action
to enforce a conciliation agreement if the respondent has allegedly
breached a contractual duty that incorporates Title VII duties, that
first impression is misleading. Enforcing the agreement would presumably further strong federal interests, both in ending the unlawful
discrimination that constitutes the breach of contract, and in promoting the conciliation process by providing a federal forum for enforcement of its goals. This apparent federal interest is underscored
by the participation of the EEOC in the negotiation, execution and
administration of the agreement, and sometimes in the enforcement
of the agreement as well. 157 Critical analysis, however, reveals that
such enforcement actions would do little to promote, and in some
ways would undermine, important federal interests in the conciliation process. Those interests are expressed by Congress in the statutory requirement of deferral to state and federal administrative
agencies prior to vindication of Title VII rights in federal court.158
Consider, for example, a hypothetical conciliation agreement
negotiated by the EEOC on behalf of Employee X. Employee X filed
timely charges with the appropriate state agency and with the
EEOC, 159 alleging that Employer denied him a promotion because of
Title doctrine if they incorporated federal laws. See, e.g., Beverlin v. IRS, 574 F. Supp. 553
(W.D. Mo. 1983).

155.

For a discussion of whether an action to enforce an EEOC conciliation agreement

should be governed by federal common law of contracts, see infra notes 223-95 and accompanying text.

156. See Cohen, supra note 70, at 912. Professor Cohen has argued in favor of an
across-the-board rule that contract actions do not "arise under" federal laws incorporated in

the contract. He believes that most contract actions should not fall within federal jurisdiction
and that a general rule applied to all contracts would serve the interests of certainty and

efficient judicial administration. Id., at 910. See also Beverlin v. IRS, 574 F. Supp. 553, 554
(W.D. Mo. 1983); Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L.
REV. 157, 183-84 (1953).
157. See supra notes 4, 5, 36-39, and accompanying text.
158. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b) to 2000e-5(e) (1982).
159. If the alleged discrimination occurs "in a State, or political subdivision of a State,
which has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice,"
an alleged discriminatee who seeks to file a charge with the EEOC must first allow the state or
local agency up to sixty days to process the charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1982). See
Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980).
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his race, in violation of section 703(a)(1) of Title VII. 160 After the
state agency terminated its proceedings, the EEOC investigated the
charge and found reasonable cause to believe it to be true. The
EEOC's conciliation culminated in a conciliation agreement joined
in by the EEOC, Employee X, and Employer, with Employer promising to pay Employee X a specified sum of money, to promote Employee X at the next available opening, to refrain from violating section 703(a)(1) in any area of the workplace during the three-year
term of the agreement, and to permit the EEOC to monitor Employer's performance under the agreement.161 In return, the EEOC
and Employee X each promised in the agreement to refrain from
bringing suit on Employee X's charge, contingent upon Employer's
performance of its contractual duties. A year later, the EEOC received information suggesting that Employer had breached the conciliation agreement by failing to promote Employee X when an appropriate position became available and by discharging another
employee, Y, because of her sex, in violation of section 703(a)(1).
In a suit by the EEOC or Employee X to enforce Employer's
contractual obligation to promote Employee X, the Kansas City Title doctrine would not apply, because Employer's obligation to promote Employee X is contractually defined without reference to federal law. A federal court would not have subject matter jurisdiction
of the action under the American Well Works test because state law
creates the cause of action and the remedy, and because the states'
interest in enforcing contractual expectations does not thwart the
federal policy of encouraging conciliations.1 62
A federal question would arise in a suit by the EEOC or Employee y' 63 to enforce Employer's contractual obligation not to engage in sex discrimination or other violations of Title VII during the
term of the agreement. To determine whether Employer breached
the agreement, the court would have to first determine whether Em160.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982).

161. Cf. 8 FAIR EMPL PRAC. MAN. (BNA) 431:70(k) - 431:70(l) (1981) (sample conciliation agreement; respondent's agreement to pay monetary relief and to refrain from violations
of Title VII over term of the agreement); 1 E.E.O.C. COMPL MAN. (CCH) 11276 at 1045-52
(1979) (standard clauses).
162. See supra notes 59-113 and accompanying text.
163. Presumably, the EEOC could sue if it had joined in the bargained-for exchange
and thus was a party to the conciliation agreement. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying
text. Employee Y might be able to sue as a third-party beneficiary of the conciliation agreement in some circumstances. See generally E. A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 10.1 - 10.7
(1982).
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ployer breached duties imposed by section 703(a)(1), incorporated

into the conciliation agreement. A direct action in federal court to
enforce that contractual provision seeks federal adjudication and remedial action on a new Title VII claim that has not first been submitted to the appropriate state agency or to the EEOC for investiga-

tion and conciliation."' Such an action would permit Employee Y to
164. See Parsons v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 741 F.2d 871, 872-73 (6th Cir. 1984)
(employee must pursue administrative remedies under Title VII before bringing action to enforce common law contract claim for breach of a Title VII settlement agreement). The Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted that "premature resort to the district court should
be discouraged as contrary to congressional intent. The preference for conciliation as the dispute resolution method in employment discrimination proceedings should not be undermined
by a party's deliberate by-pass of administrative remedies." Moteles v. University of Pa., 730
F.2d 913, 917 (3d Cir. 1984) (determining whether to grant equitable relief from the statutory
requirement that the EEOC retain a charge for 180 days before issuing notice of right to sue).
The Supreme Court has recognized the strength of the federal interest in the procedural
framework of Title VII. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 371-75
(1979). The Court held that the alleged victim of unlawful discrimination could not bypass
Title VII procedures by seeking to vindicate his Title VII rights in a federal court suit brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), a remedial statute which provides no substantive rights itself:
As part of its comprehensive plan, Congress provided that a complainant in a
State or locality with a fair employment commission must first go to that commission with his claim. Alternatively, an employee who believes himself aggrieved must
first file a charge with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
If a violation of Title VII could be asserted through § 1985(3), a complainant
could avoid most if not all of these detailed and specific provisions of the law ...
Perhaps most importantly, the complainant could completely bypass the administrative process, which plays such a crucial role in the scheme established by Congress
in Title VII.
Id. at 373, 375-76 (footnotes omitted). See Southbridge Plastics Div., W.R. Grace and Co. v.
Local 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber Workers, 565 F.2d 913, 917 (5th Cir. 1978) (action
brought under Labor Management Relations Act could not be remanded for consideration of
Title VII liability, because procedural requirements of Title VII had not been satisfied). On
the other hand, the Supreme Court has held that Title VII does not supplant other remedial
schemes that independently establish rights to equal employment. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which independently
prohibits racial discrimination in employment contracts); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36 (1974) (employee may pursue contract remedy that independently prohibits discrimination; adverse arbitral decision under the contract does not bar subsequent Title VII
suit).
An action to enforce a contract provision that incorporates Title VII duties is more like
Novotny than Johnson. Although the agreement of the parties triggers independent contract
duties under state law, the enforcement action in essence seeks directly to redress a violation of
Title VII; otherwise, the action would not present a federal question. See supra notes 129 and
142.
Moreover, it is significant that the alleged discriminatees in both Johnson and Alexander
had satisfied the procedural requirements of Title VII. Johnson, 421 U.S. at 456; Alexander,
415 U.S. at 43. If Employee Yin the hypothetical in the text had satisfied all the prerequisites
to a direct suit under Title VII, she could bring such a suit and join the contract action as a
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contravene federal statutory policy by circumventing congressionally
mandated procedures and invoking the processes of the federal
courts on a charge that might otherwise have been resolved prior to

commencement of a suit brought directly under Title VII. 65
In such a case, the policies reflected in Title VII procedures
would not be furthered by exercising federal jurisdiction in an action
to enforce provisions of an EEOC conciliation agreement that incorporates Title VII duties. 166 The question of whether Title VII would
preempt and preclude a contract action in state court to enforce Employee Y's claim is beyond the scope of this Article. It is sufficient to
conclude here that the federal interest in such an action does not
warrant application of the Kansas City Title doctrine.
B.

Section 706((3)

-

Action Brought Under Title VII

Section 706(0(3) of Title VII provides that "[e]ach United
States district court

. . .

under this subchapter.

1

shall have jurisdiction of actions brought

67

This jurisdictional grant appears similar

to section 1331's grant of jurisdiction of actions "arising under" the

provisions of Title VII. The precise relationship between the two
statutes must take one of three forms: (1) jurisdiction under section
706(0(3) may be identical to that conferred by section 1331 in actions "arising under" the provisions of Title VII;16 8 (2) the phrase
pendent claim.
165. In some circumstances a federal court may adjudicate a litigant's Title VII claims
that were not specified in the original charge filed with the EEOC or the state agency, but only
if those claims are sufficiently related to the initial charge that they fall within the scope of the
EEOC investigation that could reasonably be expected to grow out of the initial charge. See,
e.g., Fellows v. Universal Restaurants, Inc., 701 F.2d 447, 449-52 (5th Cir.) (citing to decisions from other federal circuit courts), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 828 (1983); Oubichon v. North
Am. Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569, 571-72 (9th Cir. 1973) (deferral to state agency not necessary with respect to post-charge allegations related to original charge); C. SULLIVAN, M.
ZIMMER & R. RICHARDS, FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 3.10
(1980). In some circumstances, the claim may be adjudicated even though the initial charge
was filed by a person other than the current litigant. See id. § 3.8, at 312-14 (adjudication of
claims of class members and claims of those on behalf of whom charges were filed by another).
Liberal though they are, those standards do not encompass a wide range of charges alleging
instances of unlawful conduct by the respondent that occur after negotiation of the conciliation
agreement and that have no relation to the initial charge that induced conciliation, but that
nonetheless constitute both violations of Title VII and breaches of the conciliation agreement if
true.
166. Under the "well pleaded complaint" rule, supra note 57 and accompanying text, a
defense based on federal preemption does not create grounds for federal jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 14 (1983).
167. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5()(3) (1982).
168. Under this approach, § 706(f)(3) is arguably superfluous. Section 706(f)(3) re-
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"brought under" in section 706(f)(3) may be broader than the "aris-

ing under" language of section 1331, reflecting a congressional intent
to provide a federal forum in a particularly broad range of actions
having some nexus with Title VII rights and duties; 6 9 or (3) the
"brought under" language of section 706(f)(3) may have a narrower
meaning than the "arising under" phrase in section 1331, permitting

the two statutes to operate as complementary jurisdictional provisions, perhaps reflecting congressional intent to confer exclusive federal jurisdiction 170 in a limited class of actions "brought under" Title
VII and concurrent jurisdiction of other actions whose relationship to
Title VII's remedial provisions is more attenuated.111
The process of interpreting section 706(f)(3) is one of determining congressional intent1 72 and should encompass three steps: A literal interpretation of the words of the statute, a review of the legislative history of the statute, and an attempt to harmonize the statutory
1 73
language with statutory policy.

1. Statutory Language. -

A literal interpretation of section

706(f)(3) is hardly conclusive; the phrase "brought under" is little
quires no minimum amount in controversy. See id. Consequently, until the minimum jurisdictional amount requirement of § 1331 was abolished in 1980, § 706(f)(3) presumably conferred
jurisdiction over some cases that did not meet the requirements of § 1331. See supra note 49.
Assuming, however, that Title VII is a "civil rights statute" for purposes of the jurisdictional
grant in 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(4), that jurisdictional statute would have granted jurisdiction in
Title VII enforcement suits without regard to amount in controversy. See supra note 49.
169. Section 1331 does not confer the full extent of judicial power authorized by the
Constitution. See supra note 52. Therefore, Congress could constitutionally vest district courts
with jurisdiction of cases not within the jurisdictional grant of § 1331.
170. Federal jurisdiction is not exclusive "unless Congress chooses to make it so, either
expressly or by fair implication." C. WRIGHT, supra note 15, § 10, at 35-36. Section 706(f)(3)
does not state that it confers exclusive jurisdiction. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1982). The
courts are divided on the question of whether the jurisdiction conferred by § 706(f)(3) is exclusive by implication. See Fox v. Eaton Corp., 615 F.2d 716, 719 n.7 (6th Cir. 1980) ("the
question is not an easy one"), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 935 (1981). Compare Valenzuela v.
Kraft, 739 F.2d 434 (9th Cir. 1984) (federal jurisdiction is exclusive) with Greene v. County
School Bd., 524 F. Supp. 43, 44-45 (E.D. Va. 1981) and Bennun v. Board of Governors, 413
F. Supp. 1274, 1279-80 (D.N.J. 1976) (both cases holding that federal jurisdiction is concurrent with state jurisdiction).
171. Cf. T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1964) (suggesting that a
federal common law claim in copyright litigation might fall within concurrent jurisdiction
under § 1331, rather than exclusive jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 915 (1965).
172. See Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local Div. 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union, 457
U.S. 15 (1982) (determining whether section of Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 creates a federal contract claim).
173. See, e.g., id. at 2207-10; Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 815 (1980) (interpreting word "filed" in § 706(f)(c) & (e)).
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more precise than "arising under." Nonetheless, "brought under"
may reasonably be said to suggest a narrower test on its face. One
ordinarily thinks of "bringing" an action under the law that authorizes the suit and provides for relief. Such an interpretation of
"brought under" is consistent with Holmes' narrow test for "arising
under" jurisdiction, which focuses on the law that creates the cause
of action. 174 Under this interpretation, an action to enforce an EEOC
agreement would not routinely be one "brought under" Title VII, for
reasons already discussed.' 75 This interpretation leaves open the possibility that a federal court could exercise concurrent jurisdiction
over an action whose outcome depends upon resolution 176
of a federal
question in which there is a significant federal interest.
2. Legislative History. - The legislative history of Title VII,
though inconclusive, is consistent with the conclusion that Congress
did not intend in section 706(0(3) to confer jurisdiction of actions to
enforce conciliation agreements. In fact, given Congress's rejection
of several provisions that would have explicitly extended federal jurisdiction to the enforcement of conciliation agreements, and the
lack of any duty on the part of a respondent to negotiate a conciliation agreement, such congressional intent is extremely unlikely.
As originally enacted, Title VII limited the EEOC's role primarily to investigation and conciliation. If the EEOC's investigation
of a charge established reasonable cause to believe the charge to be
true, it attempted to secure voluntary compliance from the respondent. 77 If those efforts failed, the EEOC notified the alleged discriminatees of their right to bring suit in federal district court. 78
The federal district courts had jurisdiction "of actions brought under
this subchapter."' 79 The EEOC had no authority to initiate enforcement actions in federal court. 80
The EEOC's lack of enforcement power limited its ability to
secure voluntary compliance. A respondent had little incentive to
174.

See supra notes 55-70 and accompanying text.

175. See id.
176.

See supra note 171 and accompanying text. This Article concludes that an action

to enforce a conciliation agreement would not ordinarily raise such a question. See supra notes
127-66 and accompanying text.
177.
178.
179.
180.

42 U.S.C. §
42 U.S.C. §
42 U.S.C. §
The original

2000e-5(b) (1970)
2000e-5(e) (1970)
2000e-5(f) (1970)
statute authorized

(amended 1982).
(amended 1982).
(amended 1982).
the EEOC to "commence proceedings to compel

compliance" with a court order issued in a civil action brought by the alleged discriminatee. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(i) (1970).
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enter into and abide by a conciliation agreement unless it faced the

alternative of a civil suit. 8" Unless the Justice Department brought
suit to attack a "pattern or practice" of discrimination, 82 the burden
of judicially vindicating Title VII rights fell on the alleged discriminatees, some of whom were unable or unwilling to face the burden and expense of litigation.18 3 The EEOC's poor bargaining posiinadequate enforcement power, hindered its
tion, stemming from
84

conciliation efforts.1
Between 1965 and 1971, Congress considered several bills
designed to enhance the EEOC's enforcement powers. 185 In 1976,
the Senate and the House of Representatives introduced similar bills,
H.R. 1746188 and S. 2515,187 each of which would have granted the
EEOC quasi-judicial powers similar to those enjoyed by the National Labor Relations Board. 88 Each bill authorized the EEOC to
issue complaints upon failure of conciliation, to adjudicate charges in
administrative hearings, and to issue cease-and-desist orders, subject
to review and enforcement by the federal courts of appeal.'8

9

Each

bill specifically provided for enforcement 190of EEOC conciliation
agreements in the federal courts of appeal.

181. Sape and Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824, 825 (1972).
182. The Attorney General was authorized to sue to obtain relief from a "pattern or
practice" of discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1970).
183. See S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1971). Apparently not all alleged
discriminatees were encouraged by the provision for appointment of attorney and waiver of
fees and costs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970).
184. See S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971).
185. Sape and Hart, supra note 181, at 830-31.
186. H.R. 1746, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971), reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT of 1972 [hereinafter cited as LEGIs. HIST.] 2-13.
187. S. 2515, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in LEGIS. HIST. at 377-93.
188. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982) (authorizing National Labor Relations Board to
prevent unfair labor practices).
189. See H.R. 1746, supra note 186, § 706, reprinted in LEGIS. HIST. at 2-13; S. 2515,
supra note 187, § 706, reprinted in LEGIS. HIST. at 377-93. See also LEGIS. HIST. at 195.
190. Both the House and Senate bills would have empowered the EEOC to petition a
federal court of appeals for enforcement of its order and would have conferred subject matter
jurisdiction upon the courts of appeal upon the EEOC's filing of the record with the court.
H.R. 1746, supra note 186, § 706(k), reprintedin LEGIS. HIsT. at 9; S. 2515, supra note 187,
§ 706(1), reprinted in LEGIs. HIST. at 386-87. Each bill also provided for judicial enforcement
of an EEOC conciliation agreement:
After a charge has been filed and until the record has been filed in court as
hereinafter provided, the proceeding may at any time be ended by agreement between the Commission and the ["parties" or "respondent"] for the elimination of
the alleged unlawful employment practice. . . . An agreement approved by the
Commission shall be enforceable under [the provisions authorizing the EEOC to
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Both H.R. 1746 and S. 2515 were rejected in favor of subsequent House and Senate bills that omitted provision for EEOC adjudicative hearings and cease-and-desist orders but empowered the
EEOC to seek enforcement of Title VII in the federal district
courts. 19 ' The final version of the amendment passed by both Houses
established the current procedure for either an EEOC or private suit
in federal district court after failure of conciliation. 192 The current
statute retains the general provision for jurisdiction of "actions
brought under this subchapter,"193 but it does not specifically provide
for enforcement of conciliation agreements.1 94
The rejection of the express provision for federal judicial enforcement of conciliation agreements supports the view that Congress recognized that federal jurisdiction would not otherwise extend
to such actions but, nevertheless, abandoned a proposal to confer
such jurisdiction.19 5 The rejected bills would have given the EEOC
authority to adjudicate, to issue orders, and to petition for enforcement of those orders. 6 Provisions for such authority necessarily
were abandoned with the adoption of an alternative EEOC enforcement scheme featuring initial adjudication in federal district court.
But H.R. 1746 and S. 2515 also expressly authorized actions to enforce agreements approved by the EEOC and specifically granted
petition a federal court of appeals for enforcement of its order] and [those provisions] shall be applicable to the extent appropriate to a proceeding to enforce an
agreement.
H,R. 1746, supra note 186, § 706(i), reprintedin LEGis. HisT.at 8; S.2515, supra note 187, §
706(i), reprinted in LEGis. HIsT. at 383-84.
191. H.R. 9247, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in LEacs. His. at 141-47 (reintroducing H.R. 6760, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in LEGIs. HisT. at 132-40); S.
2515, Amend. No. 884, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprintedin LEGIs. HIST. at 1499-1504.
192. The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 706(f)(1),
86 Stat. 103 (1972), reprinted in LEces. HisT. at 1900-01.
193. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1982).
194, At most, the 1972 amendments implicitly recognize the authority of the EEOC to
negotiate conciliation agreements: "If... the Commission has been unable to secure from
the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission. . . If... the Commission has not entered into a conciliation agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party
.
" The
..Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, § 706(0(1) (emphasis added), 42
US.C. § 2000e-5(0(l) (1982); see supra note 5; see also EEOC v. Liberty Trucking Co., 528
F. Supp. 610, 613 (W.D. Wis. 1981) ("Conciliation agreements . . .are the outgrowth of
these modest statutory seeds."), rev'd 695 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1982).
195. Cf. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 824 (1980) ("To the extent that Congress focused on [an issue concerning Title VII limitations periods] at all in 1972, it expressly
rejected the language that would have mandated the exact result that respondent urges.").
196. See supra note 189.
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federal jurisdiction of such actions.'97 Those provisions are consistent
with the current scheme for enforcing Title VII rights and could
have been retained in modified form.1 98
Of course, legislative rejection of proposed amendments often
provides unreliable or ambiguous evidence of legislative intent. 99
Conceivably, Congress could have collectively assumed that the general jurisdictional provision conferred jurisdiction of actions to enforce EEOC conciliation agreements, and that the rejected amendments were intended simply to transfer such actions from the federal
district courts to the federal courts of appeal.2 00 This is unlikely,
however, given the revealing pattern that emerges from the legisla-

tive history.
The original enactment, the rejected 1972 amendments, and the
adopted 1972 amendments each included grants of subject matter

jurisdiction coupled with complementary provisions specifically authorizing the EEOC or a private party to bring an action in federal
court. 20' The specific authorizations to sue identify actions intended
197. See supra note 190.
198. Congress could have provided that the EEOC or an alleged discriminatee could
enforce a conciliation agreement in federal district court in the same way that either can sue
under § 706(0(I) to redress a violation of Title VII in the event that conciliation fails.
199. See R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 160
(1975); J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 48.18, 49.10 (4th ed.
1972-73); Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 828-33 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
200. Cf. EEOC v. Liberty Trucking Co., 695 F.2d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 1982) (no indication that final amendment was intended to change earlier proposal for federal court enforcement of EEOC conciliation agreements).
201. As enacted in 1964, Title VII provided for the following actions and corresponding
subject matter jurisdiction: (1) actions by alleged discriminatees to redress unlawful employment practices, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970), with jurisdiction in the district courts of "actions brought under this subehapter," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1970); (2) actions by the
EEOC to compel compliance with a court order issued in an action brought by alleged discriminatees, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(i) (1970), with jurisdiction in the district courts of "actions
brought under this subchapter," 42 U.S.C. § 20Oe-5(f)(3) (1970); (3) actions by the Attorney General to redress a pattern and practice of discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a)
(1970), with jurisdiction in the district courts "of proceedings instituted pursuant to this section," 42 U.S.C. § 200e-6(b) (1970); (4) actions by the EEOC to enforce its demands relating to its investigation of a charge, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(b) (1970), with jurisdiction in the
district courts to issue an appropriate order, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(b) (1970); and (5) actions
by private parties for a district court order modifying or setting aside an EEOC investigatory
demand, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9(c) (1970), with jurisdiction in the district courts of "actions
brought under this subchapter," 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f) (1970).
H.R. 1746 would have provided for the following actions and corresponding subject matter jurisdiction: (1) actions by the EEOC to enforce conciliation agreements or to enforce
EEOC adjudicative orders, with jurisdiction in the federal courts of appeals "of the proceeding
and of the question determined therein," H.R. 1746, supra note 186, §§ 706(i), (k), reprinted
in LEGIs. HIsT. at 8-9; (2) actions by a party aggrieved by a final order of the EEOC for
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to be encompassed by the jurisdictional grant.20 2 In that context, the
adopted 1972 amendments expanded the effective scope of the gen-

eral jurisdictional provision, section 706(f)(3), by authorizing the
EEOC to sue for preliminary relief or to redress an unlawful employment practice.2 03 H.R. 1746 and S. 2515 illustrate that Congress
had no difficulty expressly authorizing an EEOC action to enforce a
conciliation agreement. 20 4 Yet Title VII, as enacted and amended,
has never expressly authorized any party to sue to enforce an EEOC
conciliation agreement; 20 5 indeed, it does not expressly impose any
duty on a respondent to negotiate a conciliation agreement or to perreview of the order, with jurisdiction in the federal courts of appeals to the same extent as in
EEOC actions to enforce an order, id. at § 706(1), reprinted in LEGIs. Hist. at 10-11; (3)
actions by the EEOC for preliminary injunctive relief, with jurisdiction in the federal district
courts to grant such relief "[u]pon the bringing of any such action," id. at § 706(o), reprinted
in LEGis. HisT. at 12-13; (4) actions by the Commission to enforce record-keeping requirements, with jurisdiction in the federal district courts to issue a compliance order, id. at §
709(c), reprinted in LEGis. Hist. at 16-18; (5) actions by employers, employment agencies,
and labor organizations for exemption from record-keeping requirements, with the provision
that the federal district courts "may grant appropriate relief" in such actions, id.; and (6)
actions by alleged discriminatees to redress unlawful employment practices, id. at §§ 715(a),
717(c), reprinted in LEM6s. HisT. at 23-24, 28, with jurisdiction in the federal district courts of
"actions brought under this section," id. at §§ 715(b), 717(d), reprinted in LEGIS. HIsT. at 25,
28.
S. 2515 included provisions substantially similar to those in H.R. 1746. See S. 2515,
supra note 187, §§ 706(i), (k-I), (p-r), 709(c), (e), 717 (c-d), reprinted in LEGIS. HIsT. at 38393, 396-99, 408. Additionally, S. 2515 included unusual provisions authorizing the EEOC or a
private party to petition for enforcement of an uncontested EEOC order, and empowering the
clerk of the federal court of appeals to enter a decree enforcing the EEOC order. Id. at §
706(m-n), reprinted in LEGis. HisT. at 45-46.
Title VII currently authorizes the same actions, with corresponding jurisdictional provisions, authorized in the original enactment. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(l), 2000e-5(f)(3), 2000e5(i), 2000e-8(c) (1982). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(e) (1982) (transferring authority for "pattern or practice" litigation to the EEOC). Additionally, the current statute authorizes (1) the
EEOC and federal employees to sue to redress unlawful employment practices, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-5(f)(I), 2000e-16(c) (1982), with jurisdiction in the district courts "of actions brought
under this subchapter," 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(t)(3), 2000e-7(d) (1982); and (2) actions by the
EEOC for preliminary injunctive relief, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2) (1982), with jurisdiction in
the district courts "of actions brought under this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3)
(1982). Finally, the current statute specifically provides that a federal district court "may
grant appropriate relief' in an action by a private party objecting to record-keeping requirements, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c) (1982).
202. See generally Perdue v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 690 F.2d 1091, 1092-93 (4th
Cir. 1982) C§706(0(3) vests federal courts with jurisdiction over private right of action, as
defined in § 706(0(1)).
203. See supra note 201.
204. See supra note 190. Cf. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 104 S. Ct. 2229, 2235 (1984)
("When Congress wanted to grant an employer complete immunity [from Title VII liability],
it expressly did so.").
205. See supra notes 105, 201.
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form its duties under an agreement. 0 6 In light of the care with
which Congress has expressly authorized actions falling within the
jurisdictional grant and has outlined the procedures for those actions, the argument that Congress simply assumed that the general

grant of jurisdiction encompassed actions to enforce EEOC conciliation agreements loses its force.
3. Policy. - An examination of policy considerations reveals
that although tension between principles of federalism and the remedial goals of Title VII may exist, 20 the courts may reconcile the

interests of federalism and Title VII by strictly construing the jurisdictional grant of Title VII and liberally construing the express remedial provisions of Title VII. The limited nature of federal jurisdiction and the reservation of powers to the states and their courts
favors strict construction of congressional grants of jurisdiction.2 0,
Conversely, the federal interest in eliminating employment discrimination ordinarily calls for liberal construction and application of the
provisions of Title VII. 20° In. section 706, however, the tension between these interests is more apparent than real.
The interests of federalism are best protected by strictly inter-

preting the jurisdictional grant in section 706(f)(3) to encompass
only those rights of action identified in the complementary provisions
206. See supra notes 107-08. Surprisingly, Title VII acknowledges only by implication
the authority of the EEOC and the parties to resolve a Title VII claim through execution of a
conciliation agreement. See supra notes 4-5. A proposal specifically to authorize execution of a
conciliation agreement was rejected prior to enactment of the 1964 act. See supra note 5.
207. Cf. W. R. Grace and Co. v. Local 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber Workers, 461
U.S. 757, 772 (1983) (interest in collective bargaining complemented, rather than conflicted
with, interest in Title VII conciliation); Badham v. United States District Court, 721 F.2d
1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1983) (voting rights case presents tension between "fundamental importance of the right to vote" and principles of federal-state comity in the abstention doctrine);
EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 714 F.2d 567, 579 (5th Cir. 1983) (federal interest in collective bargaining prevails over federal policy favoring resolution of Title VII claims in conciliation agreement), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2384 (1984); Association for Retarded Citizens v.
Olson, 713 F.2d 1384, 1390-91 (8th Cir. 1983) (suggesting that principles of federal-state
comity in abstention doctrine have less force in civil rights cases); Davis v. Ohio Barge Line,
Inc., 697 F.2d 549, 557 (3d Cir. 1983) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (tension between the general
policy-of interpreting jurisdictional grants narrowly and the federal interest in providing a
federal forum for a wide range of disputes involving collective bargaining agreements).
208. See supra note 48.
209. See, e.g., Craig v. Department of HEW, 581 F.2d 189, 192-93 (8th Cir. 1978);
Bell v. Brown, 557 F.2d 849, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("Title VII is remedial in character and
should be liberally construed to achieve its purposes") (citation omitted); Thomas v. KATV
Channel 7, 692 F.2d 548, 550 (8th Cir. 1982) (citing Bell and Craig), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1039 (1983). But cf. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 818-19 (1980) (Title VII is
remedial legislation, but also is the product of legislative compromise).
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of Title VII that specifically authorize the EEOC or a private party
to sue,210 thereby excluding jurisdiction of an action to enforce an
EEOC conciliation agreement.2 1

This restrictive interpretation,

moreover, does little violence to the remedial goals of Title VII. A
respondent's chief inducement to enter into a conciliation agreement
is the avoidance of litigation and liability in an action brought on the
underlying Title VII claim.212 A respondent will be similarly induced
to perform that agreement if its breach would release the EEOC and
the alleged discriminatees from their promises to refrain from suing
on the underlying claim.

13

The threat of a contract enforcement ac-

tion supplements the respondent's incentive to perform, 214 but the
does not substantially alter the
choice of forum for such an action
21 5
total consequences of breach.
The remedial goals of Title VII can be effectuated best by liberal construction of the express parameters of Title VII rights and

remedies. Title VII specifies the persons or entities subject to its provisions, 216 the conduct that it prohibits,2 17 the procedures for enforcement,218 and the remedies for violations.2 1 9 Interpreting these provisions to ensure generous coverage, 220 relief from technical procedural
210. See supra note 201.
211. See supra notes 105, 107-08. Cf. Haroldson v. Hospitality Systems, Inc., 596 F.
Supp. 1460 (D. Colo. 1984) (limited remedial power under Title VII reflects legislative intent
to preclude federal pendent jurisdiction of state tort claims).
212. See supra notes 181 and 184, and accompanying text.
213. If the respondent breaches the conciliation agreement, the EEOC and the alleged
discriminatees are released from their promises to refrain conditionally from suing on the underlying Title VII claim. See supra notes 28, 121-22 and accompanying text.
214. The EEOC or the alleged discriminatees could establish the respondent's liability
for breach of the conciliation agreement without proving the elements of the underlying Title
VII claim. See supra notes 73 and 110.
215. Cf. Gila River Indian Community v. Henningson, Durham & Richardson, 626
F.2d 708, 715 (9th Cir. 1980) (well developed state contract law is adequate to protect federal
interests in protecting Indian tribes that contract with others), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911

(1981).
216. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-16(a) (1982).
217. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3, 2000e-16(a) (1982).
218. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5, 2000e-16(b)-(d) (1982).
219. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
220. See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 104 S. Ct. 2229, 2235 (1984) (Title VII does
not exempt partnership decisions from scrutiny, and the opportunity to be considered for partnership is a term, condition, or privilege of employment); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 432 (1971) (Title VII prohibits some conduct that is discriminatory in effect, regardless
of discriminatory intent); Thurber v. Jack Reilly's, Inc., 717 F.2d 633, 635 (1st Cir. 1983)
(agreeing with other courts that the restriction on Title VII coverage to persons who employ at
least 15 employees should be liberally construed to include regular part-time employees), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1678 (1984); Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1336, 1340-41 (6th Cir.
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defects in claims, 221 and a complete remedy 222 furthers the policies
of Title VII without direct conflict with concerns of federalism, because it does not extend the jurisdictional grant in section 706(f)(3)
beyond that necessary to encompass the rights of action expressly

created by Title VII.
C.

Section 1331

-

Action Arising Under Federal Common Law

Although the provisions of Title VII do not directly provide a
basis for federal jurisdiction to enforce EEOC conciliation agreements, an action seeking such enforcement may yet "arise under"

federal law within the meaning of section 1331 if the action is governed by federal common law. 22 3 A federal court may have jurisdic-

tion under this theory if federal common law creates a cause of action for the enforcement of EEOC conciliation agreements, thus

preempting the state contract action. 224 Alternatively, a federal court
1983) (adopting broad interpretation of statutory definitions of "employee" and "employer" in
Title VII, consistent with Title VII's remedial goals).
221. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398 (1982) (period within which
to file Title VII charge with administrative agencies is subject to equitable modification, consistent with remedial purpose of Title VII); Missirlian v. Huntington Memorial Hosp., 662
F.2d 546, 549 (9th Cir. 1981) (remedial purposes of Title VII are effectuated by requiring
unequivocal notice of right to sue before commencement of the 90-day period within which to
file suit in district court), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 906 (1982).
222. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 364-65 (1977)
(district courts have broad powers to fashion a complete remedy for proven discrimination)
(quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975)); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U.S. 445, 452-56 (1976) (eleventh amendment does not bar an award of money damages
against a state government that violates Title VII); Brown v. A.J. Gerrard Mfg. Co., 715 F.2d
1549, 1550 (11 th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (court may not deduct unemployment benefits from
backpay award); Rasimas v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, 714 F.2d 614, 627-28 & n.13
(6th Cir. 1983) (court may not deduct unemployment benefits from backpay award), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 2151 (1984); EEOC Policy Statement, 53 U.S.L.W. 2400-01 (Feb. 5, 1985)
(adopting policy of enhanced remedies).
223. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 98-100 (1972); Owens v. Haas, 601
F.2d 1242, 1248 (2d Cir.) (contract claim), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979); C. WRIGHT,
supra note 15, § 17, at 97 & n.40.
Federal law probably governs the interpretation and enforcement of a settlement agreement that compromises a substantive Title VII claim over which a federal court has properly
assumed jurisdiction. See, e.g., Fulgence v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 662 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir.
1981). Cf. Gamewell Mfg., Inc. v. HVAC Supply, Inc., 715 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1983) (patent
infringement). In contrast, this Article addresses conciliation agreements reached by the parties before any claim has been filed in district court. See supra note 6.
224. Cf. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 376 F.2d 337, 339-40 (6th Cir. 1967)
(state contract action preempted by federal statute that conferred federal jurisdiction and created federal cause of action for enforcement of collective bargaining agreements), aff'd, 390
U.S. 557 (1968); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 2226 (1983) (dictum) (assumes that Avco applies in the case of preemption by federal common
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can exercise jurisdiction under the doctrine of Kansas City Title225 if
outcome-determinative issues in a state-created contract action are
governed by substantive rules of federal common law reflecting important national interests. 2 6
Under the Erie227 doctrine, federal judicial power does not extend to the creation and application of "'federal general common
law.' ",228 Nonetheless, the federal courts retain the power in a "'few
and restricted'" instances 229 to develop "specialized federal common

law" 230 which supplants state law. 23 ' The role of the federal judiciary in developing federal law may take a variety of forms on the
continuum of legislative and judicial lawmaking.232 At one end of
the continuum, a federal court may give more definite meaning to
vague statutory language through a process of interpreting or con-

struing the express terms of the statute.23 3 At the other extreme, a
federal court may create a comprehensive body of federal common
law in "wholesale" fashion, 3 4 sometimes guided by general policies
law).
225. Smith v. Kansas City Title and Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921). For a discussion of
the Kansas City Title doctrine, see supra notes 127-39 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 127-66 and accompanying text; T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339
F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965).
227. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
228. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (quoting
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)).
229, Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981), (quoting
Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963)).
230. Friendly, In Praiseof Erie - And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 383, 405 (1964).
231.

19 C. WRIGHT,

A.

MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§

4514, at 218 (1982). The Rules of Decision Act provides that state law "shall be regarded as
rules of decision in civil actions" in federal courts, unless federal laws "otherwise require or
provide." 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982). The Rules of Decision Act does not bar application of
federal common law to fill a federal statutory interstice; a determination that federal common
law should be applied satisfies the proviso in the Rules of Decision Act that permits application of federal law. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 159-61
n.13 (1983) (choice of limitations period for federal statute is a question of federal law, and
Rules of Decision Act does not bar adoption of federal limitations period).
232. See 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 231, § 4514, at 221 &
n.15, 235. See also Glus v. G. C. Murphy Co., 629 F.2d 248, 259-64 (3d Cir. 1980) (Sloviter,
J., dissenting) (describing four categories of federal judicial lawmaking), vacated, 451 U.S.
935 (1981).
233. 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 231, § 4514, at 235-36;
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 95, 97 (1981); Glus v. G.C.
Murphy Co., 629 F.2d 248, 263-64 (1980) (Sloviter, J., dissenting), vacated, 451 U.S. 935
(1981).
234. 19 C. WRIGHT. A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 231, § 4514, at 236.
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expressed in an enabling statute. 23 5 Those two -extremes form the

boundaries of a considerable body of "interstitial federal lawmaking," 236 in which the federal courts fill in the gaps created by federal
legislation.
Congress may expressly or by implication authorize the federal
courts to develop federal common law in an area within congressional regulatory power.237 Otherwise, federal common law has been
restricted to cases where it is "'necessary to protect uniquely federal
interests.' ",238 That category includes cases implicating the rights
and obligations of the United States as a sovereign, 239 disputes be-

tween states, 240 admiralty litigation, 241 and other cases in which the
application of state law would likely conflict with important federal
242
interests.
In creating a rule of federal common law, a federal court typically addresses two questions: (1) Should the court use federal
common law to supplant state law in an interstice created by incomplete federal legislation? (2) If so, what should be the content of
the federal common law rule? 243 In a few cases, however, federal
235. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (§ 301 of
Labor Management Relations Act authorizes judicial development of federal common law of
contracts for enforcement of collective bargaining agreements; policy from national labor laws
provides guidance for determining content of the federal common law).
236. United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973) (citing
Mishkin, The Variousness of "FederalLaw" Competence and Discretion in the Choice of
National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 800 (1957)).
237. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (citing
Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963)); 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER,
supra note 231, § 4514, at 224.
238. Texas Indus., Inc., v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (quoting
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964)).
239. E.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979) (priority of federal
liens); United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973) (federal interest in
real property); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947) (right of federal government to indemnity); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (federal
government's rights against guarantor of endorsements on forged check drawn on U.S. Treasury). See Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981).
240. E.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (suit by state against cities
of sister state to abate nuisance); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co.,
304 U.S. 92 (1938) (rights of respective states in interstate streams). See Texas Indus., Inc. v.
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981).
241. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95-96
(1981) (citing Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20-21 (1963)).
242. E.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (foreign
relations).
243. See, e.g., 19 C. WRIGHT. A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 231, § 4514, at 225,
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courts have given little attention to the first question, applying federal common law almost automatically in disputes related to, but not
specifically governed by, federal legislation.244 In those cases, the
courts typically expend greater energy addressing the second question and determining whether to give content to the federal common
law by incorporating a state rule of decision or by developing an
2 45
independent federal rule.
Such a casual approach to the first question is inimical to our
federal system and, at least in some cases, rests on misapplication of
Supreme Court authority. In Georgia Power Co. v. Sanders,246 for
example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
applied federal common law to determine the amount of compensation to be paid by federal licensees that exercised the power of eminent domain pursuant to a federal statute. The court applied federal
common law because the federal "licensees derive[d] their authority
to exercise the power of eminent domain from" a federal statute.241
As authority for that conclusion, the court cited to three decisions of
the United States Supreme Court: United States v. Kimbell Foods,
Inc.;248 United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co.;249 and
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States.250 The federal interests in
those cases, however, were based on more than federal statutory authorization of activities that led to a dispute; in each, the United
States acted as a real party in interest and asserted claims that
would have a direct effect on the treasury or property rights of the
United States government. 25 1 The Sanders court applied principles
of federalism 252 to select the state law as the federal common law
244. See, e.g., Georgia Power Co. v. Sanders, 617 F.2d 1112, 1115 (5th Cir. 1980) (en
banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 936 (1981); Agnew v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 548 F. Supp.
1234, 1237 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
245. See, e.g., Georgia Power Co. v. Sanders, 617 F.2d 1112, 1115-24 (5th Cir. 1980)

(en banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 936 (1981).
246.
247.

617 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 936 (1981).
Id. at 1115.

248. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
249,

412 U.S. 580 (1973).

250.

318 U.S. 363 (1943).

251. See Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 718-25 (question of priority of federal liens in
federal lending program); Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. at 582-83 (suit by United
States to quiet title in real property that had been subject to conditional reservation of mineral

rights); Clearfield Trust Co., 318 U.S. at 364-65 (suit by United States to recover on guarantor's promise). See also United States v. Ellis, 714 F.2d 953, 954 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing
Kimbell in case involving rights of the United States).
252.

Sanders, 617 F.2d at 1115-16.
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rule. 253 It would have adhered more faithfully to those principles of
federalism, however, had it required a greater showing of federal interest before applying federal common law, whatever its content.2 "4
The threshold determination whether to apply federal common
law is significant even if state law is absorbed as the federal common
law rule. The development and application of the federal common
law rule may affect the division of power between state and federal
courts by providing the sole basis for subject matter jurisdiction.25"
It may also present the risk of conflict with the constitutional separation of legislative and judicial powers; 256 the creation of federal common law to facilitate enforcement of rights may encroach upon the
congressional legislative function by seeking to supplement "a comprehensive legislative scheme including an integrated system of procedures for enforcement. ' 257 Title VII is such a legislative scheme. 58
Accordingly, the initial decision to apply federal common law
should be made with the same sensitivity to concerns of federalism
as the determination of the content of the federal common law.
Those concerns should counsel greater hesitation when a court endeavors to create a comprehensive body of federal common law in
"wholesale" fashion than when it engages in more limited forms of
interstitial lawmaking that lie closer to simple statutory interpreta259
tion on the federal lawmaking continuum.
253.
254.

Id. at 1115-24.
See id. at 1124-25 (Fay, J., concurring).

255. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 98-100 (1972). See also Sanders,
617 F.2d at 1126 (Fay, J.,concurring) (describing other problems of federalism that arise in

the application of federal common law, even where the state rule is adopted).
256.

The Court has "consistently

. .

.emphasized that the federal lawmaking power is

vested in the legislative, not the judicial, branch of government; therefore, federal common law
is 'subject to the paramount authority of Congress.'" Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport
Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981) (quoting New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 348
(1931)). Cf. Sanders, 617 F.2d at 1127-29 (Fay, J.,concurring) (judicial development of independent federal rule presents separation-of-powers problem). See generally Allen v. Crocker

Nat'l Bank, 733 F.2d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (deferring to Congress rather
than supplanting state law with federal common law).

257.

Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981). See

Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 643-46 (1981) (comprehensive
damages provisions of federal anti-trust statute leave no interstices to fill with federal common
law rule).
258. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981)

(completeness of the enforcement provisions of Title VII and the Equal Pay Act raise presumption that Congress deliberately omitted provision for right of action against codis-

criminator for contribution).
259.

See, e.g., Glus v. G.C. Murphy Co., 629 F.2d 248, 259-60, 263-64 (3d Cir. 1980)

(Sloviter, J., dissenting) (contrasting interstitial statutory construction with creation of inde-
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Judicial development of federal common law that creates a
cause of action for enforcement of an EEOC conciliation agreement,
or that sets forth substantive rules governing such an action, is more
like "wholesale" lawmaking than simple statutory interpretation. Because Title VII does not expressly create any rights or duties concerning conciliation agreements,260 judicial creation of a right of action, or a set of rules to govern such an action, goes beyond simply
giving meaning to congressional intent imperfectly expressed in statutory language; it fills a substantial gap or interstice in Title VII,
bounded on one end by the comprehensive provisions for actions to
redress unlawful employment practices,2 6' and on the other end by
Title VII's implicit recognition of EEOC conciliation agreements as
a means of settlement.26 2 A federal court should engage in such lawmaking only if authorized by Congress to do so or if necessary to
protect important federal interests.26 s
Congressional authorization to create federal common law has
sometimes been inferred from legislation that specifically creates a
right of action and confers subject matter jurisdiction over the action. In the best known example, Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Mills,2 64 the Supreme Court held that section 301(a) of the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947265 reflects a congressional intent
to authorize the federal courts to develop a comprehensive body of
federal common law governing suits to enforce collective bargaining
agreements.2 6 Section 301 clearly purports to vest the federal courts
with subject matter jurisdiction over such actions,2 67 and its language and legislative history permit the conclusion that Congress intended to create a right of action to enforce such contracts 26 8 and to
impose sanctions for breaches of agreements to arbitrate grievance
pendent common law rule), vacated, 451 U.S. 935 (1981).
260. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 218.
262. See supra note 5.
263. See supra notes 237-38, 254-56 and accompanying text.
264. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
265. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1982).
266. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 450-51.
267. Id. at 451-52. The statute provides in part:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization ...
or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.

29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
268. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 453-54.
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disputes. 269 In light of those congressional purposes, the Court inferred from section 301 a congressional intent to delegate to the federal courts the task of creating a body of substantive law describing
those federal rights and remedies. 270 The Lincoln Mills Court had
great incentive to apply substantive federal law: By holding that
section 301 not only confers jurisdiction but also authorizes the development and application of substantive federal law governing the
interpretation and enforcement of collective bargaining agreements,
the Court avoided the difficult question of whether the Constitution
empowers Congress to grant "protective" federal jurisdiction of an
action in which the parties are nondiverse and the rights and remedies are defined wholly by state contract law. 1
The Lincoln Mills decision may be the "high water mark" in
federal common law jurisprudence,272 and, even assuming its continued vitality, its analysis does not apply to an action to enforce an
EEOC conciliation agreement. A specific statutory grant of federal
jurisdiction of actions to enforce conciliation agreements, coupled
with supporting legislative history, could support an inference of direct congressional authorization to develop federal common law governing such actions, thus avoiding potential constitutional problems
in the jurisdictional grant.213 Congress, however, rejected proposed
language for Title VII that would have specifically granted federal
jurisdiction of actions to enforce conciliation agreements,274 and this
Article has concluded that Title VII's general jurisdictional grant,
section 706(f)(3), does not extend to such actions.2 Creation of a
body of federal common law to govern these actions would itself provide the statutory basis for subject matter jurisdiction under the general federal question provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 .276 But in contrast to the legislation in Lincoln Mills, neither the statutory
provisions nor the legislative history of Title VII provides a basis for
inferring direct congressional authorization to develop a body of fed269.

Id. at 455.

270.

Id. at 456-57.

271.

Id. at 469-84 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

272. See generally C. WRIGHr, supra note 15, § 60, at 391-94 (Lincoln Mills doctrine
led to a "few extreme decisions" from the courts of appeals, but the Supreme Court "more
recently has taken a cautious course toward the recognition of federal common law").
273. See supra notes 266-71 and accompanying text. Cf. supra note 53 (discussing
whether an action to enforce an EEOC conciliation agreement is encompassed by article III
judicial power).
274. Supra note 223.
275. Supra notes 167-222 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 223-40 and accompanying text.
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eral common7 law governing actions to enforce EEOC conciliation
2
agreements. 7
Consequently, the development of such federal common law
must rest on the need to protect important federal interests. 278 The

development and application of federal common law may be necessary to protect national interests in disputes that raise questions
about the rights and obligations of the United States.2 79 In accordance with the principles of federalism and separation of powers that
counsel judicial restraint, 280 the courts have invoked this doctrine
only in suits raising claims that would directly affect the United
States Treasury 281 or proprietary rights of the United States. 282 An

action to enforce a conciliation agreement, even if initiated by the
EEOC as a formal party to that agreement, is not such a suit. Although an enforcement action may vindicate national interests in
equal employment opportunity as well as purely individual rights,28 3
all tangible pecuniary and specific relief will be awarded to individual private claimants.284
277. Title VII's implicit recognition of conciliation agreements as a means of settling
Title VII claims, supra note 5, is far less convincing evidence of congressional authorization
than the express statutory grant of federal jurisdiction in Lincoln Mills. See Local Div. 732,
Amalgamated Transit Union v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 667 F.2d 1327,
1345 (11th Cir. 1982) (contrasting Lincoln Mills, court noted that it had "no jurisdictional
grant from which to infer a congressional intention that we fashion" federal common law
governing agreements mandated by a federal statute).
278. See Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981).
279. See supra note 239 and cases cited therein.
280. Supra notes 48 and 256.
281. Compare United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 306 (1947) (government suit for indemnity affects U.S. Treasury and is governed by federal law) and Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (applying federal law to government suit
against guarantor of endorsement on forged check drawn on U.S. Treasury) with Miree v.
DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 27-29 (1977) (applying state contract law to private third-party
claim against county, based on county's contractual duties to federal agency, because the claim
would not affect United States Treasury). See Sam Macri & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 313
F.2d 119, 124 n.l (9th Cir. 1963) (action on prime contract between United States and private
contractor governed by federal law, but action on subcontract between private parties governed
by state law).
282. E.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979) (dispute concerning priority of federal liens); United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580
(1973) (United States brought suit to quiet title to real property where previous landowner
retained a conditional reservation of mineral rights).
283. See Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 711 F.2d 1117,
1128-29 & n.14 (2d Cir. 1983) (Title VII settlements "vindicate an important societal interest
by promoting equal opportunity"), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 997 (1984).
284. See, e.g., supra note 26. Some states might award attorneys fees to the EEOC
where it prevails in its enforcement action. See, e.g., ARIZ. RaV. STAT. ANN. 12-341.01 (1978).
Cf. EEOC v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 34 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 34,469 (D. Ohio
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The most promising basis for federal common law in an enforcement action is the risk that application of state law would directly
conflict with important federal policies underlying Title VII. 285 Creation of federal common law may be appropriate if necessary to encourage and maintain conciliation as the primary means of achieving equal employment opportunity. 286 State contract actions might

not preserve the credibility of the conciliation process if state contract remedies were inadequate or if diversity in contract law among
the states significantly hampered the EEOC's ability to negotiate
and administer conciliation agreements.287 But federal common law
should be based on more than a speculative conflict between state
law and federal interests. 8 State courts can draw from well developed bodies of state contract law to protect the contractual expecta-

tions of parties to conciliation agreements,2 89 and there is no reason
to suspect that state courts will be generally hostile to such contract

actions.2 90 Although many state courts would probably hesitate to
grant specific relief, 291 the threat of an action on the contract pro-

vides only part of the incentive for a respondent to perform its obligations under a conciliation agreement; just as the underlying Title
VII claim induced the employer to enter into the conciliation agreement, the prospect of its revival should induce the respondent to reMar. 6, 1984) (costs awarded to EEOC under terms of settlement agreement). But cf. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1982) (excluding EEOC and United States from eligibility for award of
fees in Title VII action).
285. Cf. Eatmon v. Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc., 769 F.2d 1503, 1513-17 (11th Cir.
1985) (applying federal law to the enforcement and interpretation of an Executive Order
11246 conciliation agreement, even though state contract law created the right and remedy);
Grinnell Fire Protection Sys. Co. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 554 F. Supp. 495, 498-99 (N.D.
Cal. 1982) (federal law applied in diversity suit between private parties involving contract for
national security-related research that the federal government had supervised).
286. See supra note 23.
287. See EEOC v. Liberty Trucking Co., 695 F.2d 1038, 1043 (7th Cir. 1982). Diversity in state contract law does not justify application of federal common law, however, unless
that diversity significantly conflicts with federal policy. See In re "Agent Orange" Product
Liability Litigation, 635 F.2d 987, 994 (2d Cir. 1980) ("uniformity is not prized for its own
sake"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981).
288. See Bank of Am. v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 33-34 (1956); Pankow Constr. Co. v.
Advance Mortgage Corp., 618 F.2d 611, 616 (9th Cir. 1980).
289. Cf. Local Div. 732, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid
Transit Auth., 667 F.2d 1327, 1338 (11th Cir. 1982) (enforcement of agreements mandated
by the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964); Gila River Indian Community v. Henningson, Durham & Richardson, 626 F.2d 708, 715 (9th Cir. 1980) (enforcement of contracts
between Indian tribes and others).
290. See supra note 119.
291. Supra note 115.
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frain from breaching the agreement 2 ..
State enforcement of conciliation agreements will undoubtedly
preclude perfect uniformity in the rules applied and the results they
engender. Although "the principles of contract law do not differ
greatly from one jurisdiction to another," 29 3 courts in different states
will inevitably give different interpretations to some standard-form
clauses intended by the EEOC to have a uniform meaning and will
reach decisions at the margin that are arguably inconsistent. But
perfect uniformity is not necessary to protect the credibility of the
conciliation process. The contract law of each state is designed to
protect contractual expectations, thereby encouraging contracting
parties to enter into agreements and to rely on contractual
promises. 29 4 Absence of perfect uniformity among the states should
not discourage parties from entering into conciliation agreements
any more than it discourages parties from entering into other kinds
of contractual relationships. Moreover, absence of perfect uniformity
should not significantly hamper the EEOC's administrative function.
Where standard-form clauses in conciliation agreements are interpreted differently in different states, the regional offices of the EEOC
can tailor conciliation agreements to the occasional peculiarities of a
particular state's contract laws. 295
The effectiveness of the conciliation process might in fact be enhanced by enforcement of conciliation agreements in a federal forum
applying federal common law. Principles of federalism, however,
counsel restraint in this area. The problems inherent in state enforcement of conciliation agreements are not so great as to justify the
development of federal common law in the absence of a specific congressional grant of jurisdiction or any other reflection of a congressional intent to delegate its legislative function.
CONCLUSION

Without a clear congressional grant of jurisdiction, the exercise
of federal jurisdiction to enforce an EEOC conciliation agreement
raises problems of federalism, which the courts must balance against
the remedial policy of Title VII. Congress could most easily address
292, Supra notes 181, 184, 213 and accompanying text.
293. Hall v. Perry, 703 F.2d 1339, 1348 n.4 (9th Cir. 1983).
294, E. A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.1, at 812 (1982).
295. See EEOC v. Liberty Trucking Co., 528 F. Supp. 610, 619 (W.D. Wis. 1981),
rev'd, 695 F,2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1982).
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the tension between those policies by amending section 706(f)(1)296
of Title VII to specifically authorize the EEOC or alleged discriminatees to bring a civil action to enforce a conciliation agreement, thereby bringing such actions within the express grant of federal jurisdiction under section 706(f)(3). In this way, such actions
would be added to the class of actions encompassed within Title
VII's general jurisdictional grant.297
Absent such legislative action, the federal courts should resolve
the jurisdictional question in a way that is compatible with the interests of federalism as well as with equal opportunity. The courts can
best accomplish that goal by broadly construing the express provisions defining Title VII rights and liabilities, 298 by treating an action
to enforce a conciliation agreement as a state contract claim, and by
recognizing procedures that permit revival of the underlying Title
VII claim in the event of a respondent's breach of a conciliation
299
agreement.

296. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982).
297. See generally supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text, and text accompanying
note 211.
298. See supra notes 216-22 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 121-22, and accompanying text.
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